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In this paper, we introduce the concept of an assortment auction, where a seller is selling substitute
products/services with fixed prices (as in assortment optimization), and buyers compete for a limited supply
of these products in an auction. Each buyer reports a ranked list of products she is willing to purchase at
their given prices, after which the seller allocates products to buyers using a truthful mechanism, subject
to a supply constraint on the total number of products allocated. The seller collects revenues equal to the
prices of the products allocated, and would like to design a mechanism to maximize total revenue, when the
buyers’ lists are drawn independently from known distributions.
When there is one buyer, our mechanism design problem reduces to the assortment optimization problem,
which is known to be tractable for lists drawn from a Markov Chain choice model. We extend this result
and compute the optimal auction, when there are multiple buyers with heterogeneous Markov Chain choice
models. Moreover, we show that the optimal auction is structurally “Myersonian”, in that each buyer is
assigned a virtual valuation based on her reported list and list distribution, after which the mechanism
maximizes the virtual surplus. Since Markov Chain choice models capture the classical notion of a valuation
distribution, our optimal assortment auction generalizes the classical Myerson’s optimal auction. Markov
chains also capture the commonly used Multi-Nomial Logit (MNL) choice model. Finally, we show that
without the Markov chain assumption, the optimal assortment auction may be structurally non-Myersonian.
To conclude, we apply our theory in online assortment problems, where buyers arrive sequentially and
must be offered an assortment immediately. First, we use the virtual valuations for Markov Chain choice
models to derive personalized assortment policies. Moreover, we show that any personalized assortment
policy is a special case of a truthful assortment auction, and hence the optimal assortment auction provides a
tighter benchmark than the commonly-used “deterministic LP” for online assortment problems. This tighter
benchmark yields the first approximation guarantees for these problems which break the “barrier” of 1−1/e.
1. Introduction
Personalized recommendations have become ubiquitous in the operations of modern-day online
platforms. The optimization of such operations is often modeled using the online assortment prob-
lem, which can be described as follows. A platform is selling n substitutable products with fixed
prices r1, . . . , rn. Customers visit the online platform sequentially and are each offered a subset, or
1
2assortment, of these products, from which they choose their most-preferred. A customer can always
choose the “no-purchase” option represented by a product 0 with r0 = 0. The platform has limited
capacities for procuring the products, but can adjust its assortment offerings in an online fashion
to maximize the total revenue earned from all the customers. Starting with Golrezaei et al. (2014),
there has been much work in analyzing the performance of these online assortment policies—but
in all situations, unsurprisingly, the online nature of such a policy leaves money on the table.
In this paper, we ask—what if the platform could first have the customers report their preferences,
and then make a global allocation considering all the reports? That is, run an auction. For example,
a classical combinatorial auction with unit-demand buyers would work as follows:
• Each buyer i wants at most one product and has a valuation vij for receiving each product j;
• All buyers (strategically) report their valuations to the platform, and based on these reports,
the platform allocates a product ji (possibly ji = 0) to each buyer i and charges a payment pi;
• Each buyer i attempts to maximize (the expectation of) her utility, vji − pi.
However, in the assortment setting, the auction would differ in the following ways:
• The prices r1, . . . , rn for the products have been pre-determined by exogenous sources;
• The customer utilities have been reduced to an ordinal ranking over the options of “buy
product j for price rj” over j =0,1, . . . , n, and this is what they report to the platform;
• The platform is only allowed to charge the price of the product allocated to a customer.
These are salient features for many online platforms, who do not control the pricing, but control
the assortments that are displayed to customers.
To our knowledge, we are the first to study mechanism design in this setting, where the plat-
form’s objective is revenue maximization, yet it is without money1 in the sense that the auction
cannot charge arbitrary payments, being bound by the fixed prices of the products. We restrict
to deterministic, dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms, so that buyers are incentivized to report
their true ordinal rankings regardless of their risk tolerance2. Also, we adopt a Bayesian setup,
where the buyer rankings are drawn from known, independent (non-identical) distributions. The
problem is then formally defined as: maximize the expected revenue of a mechanism with respect
to these random rankings, subjective to it being deterministic, truthful, and satisfying the product
capacity constraints in its allocations.
1 Mechanism design without money refers to settings where agents have ordinal preferences and monetary payments
are forbidden, in which case the objective focuses on social outcomes (Schummer and Vohra 2007). Our setting forbids
arbitrary monetary compensation, but attaches “revenues” rj to products, so there is a cardinal sum to maximize.
2With ordinal preferences, it is unclear how the buyer’s behavior under uncertainty should be defined (see e.g.
Chakrabarty and Swamy 2014). We leave this outside the scope of the paper.
3Relation to assortment optimization. Our problem is a generalization of the basic assort-
ment optimization problem for a single customer with a known ranking distribution (see e.g.
Aouad et al. 2018). Indeed, when there is a single buyer in our auction, a mechanism is fully
characterized by an assortment of items which is made available to the buyer. We formalize this
relationship in Proposition 1; it is analogous to the taxation principle from the classical auctions
setting.
Relation to online assortment. Our problem is a relaxation of the aforementioned online
assortment problem, in that online assortment policies constitute a subclass of truthful mechanisms,
while we are optimizing over all truthful mechanisms. We formalize this relationship in Lemma 6;
it is analogous to the fact that “sequential posted pricing” constitutes a subclass of mechanisms
in the classical auctions setting (Chawla et al. 2010).
1.1. Results for Assortment Auction Optimization
In light of the relationships above, we refer to our mechanism design problem as “assortment
auction optimization”, as it is the natural analogue of an auction in the assortment setting.
Hereafter, we will assume that the capacity constraints are single-leg, in that the products corre-
spond to different “services” which share a common limited resource, instead of having individual
capacity constraints. This is the first building block studied in many revenue management prob-
lems (e.g. Gallego and Van Ryzin 1994, Talluri and Van Ryzin 2004), in which the products are
different “fare classes” (e.g. economy vs. basic economy, rack rate vs. advance-purchase rate) at
which a single “item” (e.g. seat on flight leg, hotel room) could be sold. Another benefit of the
single-leg setting is that it captures products which are sold at different prices to different buyers.3
In our auction, a single-leg capacity constraint translates to allowing at most b “winners” who
are allocated a non-zero product.4 In the introduction, we will further restrict our discussion to
single-winner auctions, where b= 1.
Under the single-winner assumption, our problem also has a natural relation to classical auctions.
Suppose that the preferences are buy-down, where any realizable ranking prefers the non-zero
products in order of low-to-high prices. Such a ranking is characterized by a valuation, equal
to the maximum price of a product ranked higher than product 0. In this case, the remarkable
result of Myerson (1981) says the optimal mechanism is deterministic, dominant-strategy-truthful,
3 Indeed, to model a product with a buyer-dependent price, we can replace it with a copy of itself for each buyer.
These copies will then each have their own price rj , while still consuming the same single-leg capacity, so we have
merely increased the number of products. By contrast, if products had individual capacity constraints, then whether
prices are buyer-dependent makes a big difference; cf. Golrezaei et al. (2014) vs. Ma and Simchi-Levi (2017).
4 In fact, our results hold in a more general setting where the set of winners is constrained to lie in an arbitrary
downward-closed feasible family F , which allows, e.g., one customer to request two seats on the flight.
4and can be implemented in a way where the winner always pays one of the prices in r1, . . . , rn.
5
Hence, Myerson’s mechanism can be implemented in our setting in the special case of buy-down
preferences. Moreover, Myerson’s mechanism has a particular structure, where each buyer, based
on only her report and distribution, is assigned a univariate score called a virtual valuation; the
winner is then the buyer with the highest virtual valuation. We will call this a “Myersonian”
structure.
Unfortunately, for arbitrary preference distributions, we show that the optimal auction may not
have the Myersonian structure. Namely, when non-zero products are not necessarily ranked in order
of low-to-high prices, even with two IID buyers, the optimal allocation rule may want buyer 1 to
win the auction when the buyers report the same ranking, and buyer 2 to win when they report
different rankings. Such an allocation rule clearly cannot be defined via virtual valuations.
On the positive side though, we show that for preference distributions induced by Markov Chain
choice models, the optimal mechanism is structurally Myersonian, and computationally tractable.
This is a broad class of choice models introduced in Zhang and Cooper (2005), Blanchet et al.
(2016), where the random ranking satisfies a memorylessness property that the next product in the
ranking depends probabilistically on only the current product, and not the entire history. Markov
Chain choice models capture the buy-down preferences corresponding to the classical auctions
setting, so our result generalizes Myerson’s mechanism for discrete valuations. They also capture the
commonly-used Multi-Nomial Logit (MNL) choice model (a.k.a. the Plackett-Luce vase model), as
well as the independent demand model (a.k.a. having single-minded buyers). The latter is equivalent
to the accept-reject problem studied in prophet inequalities, which we will discuss in Section 1.4.
1.2. Description of Optimal Myersonian Auction for Markov Chain Choice Models
Our generalized Myerson’s mechanism in the assortment setting assigns each buyer a virtual val-
uation based on her reported ranking and ranking distribution. We now explain our assignment
procedure, which is a generalization of how virtual valuations can be assigned in the classical
auctions setting based on the “ironed revenue curve”.
We will consider the following example: there are four products A,B,C,D with prices
rA = 12, rB = 7.5, rC = 4.5, rD = 4. One buyer’s ranking distribution is uniform over lists
(CBA), (CB), (CD), (C), where e.g. list (CB) means that her first choice is to buy product C at
price rC , second choice is to buy product B at price rB, and third choice is to buy nothing (note
that we can ignore the ordering after the no-purchase option).
5 See Elkind (2007), who derives Myerson’s mechanism for discrete valuations. Note that there do exist randomized,
symmetric implementations of Myerson, but the one which is deterministic and breaks ties in a consistent order
always charges one of the prices in r1, . . . , rn, and falls under our setting. This mechanism is “remarkable” in that it
is optimal among the larger class of randomized, Bayesian-truthful mechanisms with arbitrary payments.
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Figure 1 The points (Q(S),R(S)) plotted for every S, all of which are equivalent to one of the six assortments
shown. The revenue frontier is the upper concave envelope shown in red, formed by joining the sequence of
efficient assortments. The slopes of the revenue frontier and the resulting virtual valuations V are shown in blue.
Auction pre-processing. Fix a buyer and consider the assortment optimization problem with
just that buyer. For an assortment S, let Q(S) denote the probability of selling a product when S
is offered, and let R(S) denote the expected revenue. In the example above, if S = {A,B,D}, then
Q(S) = 3
4
and R(S) = 1
2
rB +
1
4
rD = 4.75.
Now, consider the two-dimensional plot consisting of points (Q(S),R(S)) for every assortment
S. Call the upper concave envelope of these points the revenue frontier. The revenue frontier is
formed by connecting the points for a sequence of efficient assortments. In the example above, this
sequence is {A},{A,D},{A,B,D},{A,B,C,D}, as depicted in Figure 1.
Virtual valuation assignment. Fix a buyer and suppose that the sequence of efficient assort-
ments for her list distribution has been identified. Now, if she reports a realized list of ℓ, then her
virtual valuation is determined by the first efficient assortment S which intersects ℓ, and equals
the slope of the revenue frontier on the left side of point (Q(S),R(S)).
In the example above, if ℓ= (CD), then {A,D} is the first efficient assortment to intersects ℓ,
since the earlier assortment in the sequence, {A}, does not. The virtual valuation is the slope of
the line segment from (Q({A}),R({A})) to (Q({A,D}),R({A,D})), equal to 4 (see Figure 1).
Winner and allocation. Suppose that each buyer has been assigned a virtual valuation based
on her list and distribution, as described above. The winner is then the buyer with the highest
virtual valuation. She is allocated her most-preferred product from the assortment whose left-side
slope represents the minimum virtual valuation she could have had to win the auction.
6In the example above, suppose that the buyer’s list realizes to (CBA) and that her virtual
valuation of 12 is the highest. If the second-highest virtual valuation is 3.5, then she would get
her most-preferred product from assortment {A,D}, whose left-side slope is 4 (see Figure 1). As a
result, she would end up paying 12 for product A. On the other hand, if the second-highest virtual
valuation is 2.5, then she would get to choose from assortment {A,B,D}, whose left-side slope is
3. As a result, she would choose her more-preferred option of purchasing product B.
Like in Myerson’s original mechanism, a negative virtual valuation is not allowed to win the
auction, and hence even with no competition from other buyers, this buyer would still be choosing
from assortment {A,B,D} (not assortment {A,B,C,D}, whose left-side slope is -1). {A,B,D} is
our analogue of a reserve price, and solves the single-buyer assortment optimization problem.
Some intuition on the virtual valuations and allocation mechanism.
• The highest virtual valuation is always equal to the highest price, and is the virtual valuation
for any lists, in this case (CBA), which contain the highest-priced product, in this case A.
• Note that list (CB) has a lower virtual valuation than (CD), despite containing higher-priced
product B in place of D. This is because product B cannibalizes the sale of product A in the
list (CBA), whereas product D does not. Put another way, list (CB) has a higher information
rent than (CD); the mechanism have to assign a low virtual valuation to (CB) so that when the
buyer’s actual list is (CBA), she has no incentive to lie about it being (CB) in hopes of receiving
a more-preferred item.
• In the example above, the efficient assortments happened to be nested, with {A} ⊂ {A,D} ⊂
{A,B,D}. This means that less competition (lower virtual valuations from other buyers) leads
to more selection for the winner, which is consistent with the intuition from classical auctions.
However, we show that an optimal Myersonian mechanism could also have non-nested efficient
assortments. In this case, less competition could lead to a less-preferred outcome for the winner!
1.3. Establishing Optimality for Markov Chain Choice Models
Nothing from the auction described in Section 1.2 required the list distributions to arise from
Markov chains. However, now we describe what could go wrong without such an assumption,
thereby sketching our proof that the auction is optimal for Markov Chain choice models.
First, we need to show that the revenue frontier and efficient assortments from Section 1.2 can
be tractably computed. While there are exponentially-many possible assortments in general, we
show that the revenue frontier for a Markov Chain choice model can be greedily constructed, based
on a sequence of products (Section 4). We show how to tractably find this sequence, using the
externality-adjustment paradigm of De´sir et al. (2019). We note that our sequence used to form
7the revenue frontier is different from the sequence used by De´sir et al. (2019) for their constrained
assortment optimization problem.
Second, we need to show that in the allocation rule from Section 1.2, whenever the winner has
a positive virtual valuation, the assortment she gets to choose from actually contains a product
she wants. This is not obvious; in fact, there exist distributions (Example 3 in Section 3.3)
for which the winner may be allocated no product! Nonetheless, we introduce a condition called
implementability, under which the winner always buys a product and the virtual surplus6 is earned
by the Myersonian mechanism (Section 3.2). We show that having nested efficient assortments is
sufficient (Section 3.3), but not necessary (Example 2 in Section 3.3), for implementability,
and show that it is satisfied under Markov Chain choice models (Section 4.1).
Third, we need to show that earning the virtual surplus is optimal. This does not follow from
above; in fact, in our example where the optimal auction is non-Myersonian (Example 1 in Sec-
tion 3.3), implementability is satisfied and the efficient assortments are even nested! Nonetheless,
we introduce a condition called insurmountability which ensures that the virtual surplus cannot
be surpassed by a truthful mechanism (Section 3.2). We show that it is satisfied under Markov
Chain choice models, by proving that the bad cannibalization patterns from our bad examples
cannot arise under the memorylessness property of Markov chains (Section 4.1).
1.4. Application to Online Assortment Problems
Thus far, we have analyzed the theoretical concept of an assortment auction, which expects cus-
tomers to report their preferences and then “wait” until the auction is over to receive a product.
In the concluding Section 6, we discuss places where this may be applicable.
However, currently in online platforms, customers visit sequentially and expect to immediately
purchase a product, as modeled by the online assortment problem. Fortunately, our theory also has
immediate implications for this problem, under the single-leg constraint where there is capacity to
procure a fixed number of products. We consider variants of the online assortment problem, which
differ based on the uncertainty in the arrival order of buyers.
Deriving the revenue frontier for Markov Chain choice models. Our theory implies a
simple computation of the revenue frontier for a Markov Chain choice model, and moreover, shows
that the efficient assortments are always nested (Section 4.2). This is important, because7 the
optimal policy only has to consider the nested efficient assortments lying on the revenue frontier.
6This is the expected value of the maximum among all virtual valuations and 0.
7 Indeed, the revenue frontier captures the fundamental tradeoff in single-leg problems, because it identifies assort-
ments which maximize “bang per buck”, i.e. which earn the greatest expected revenue relative to the likelihood of
consuming a unit of capacity.
8As a result, if the buyers arrive in a known order (as in the typical revenue management setup
with non-stationary arrivals), then we can derive the optimal policy using dynamic programming,
by first pre-processing the efficient assortments for each buyer (Section 5.1). When a buyer arrives,
the smaller the cost of capacity consumption given the current state, the larger an assortment
within her nested sequence that should be offered. Although similar results have appeared in
Feldman and Topaloglu (2017) for Markov Chain choice models, their derivation assumes that the
customers have identical ranking distributions, while ours does not. Also, we explicitly construct
the nested assortments used by the optimal policy, while they implicitly derive a nested structure
from solving many instances of assortment optimization problem using linear programming.
Finally, in the special case of the MNL choice model, we recover the result from
Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) that the assortments forming the revenue frontier are nested in order
of descending prices (Section 4.2.1). Moreover, our derivation shows that all of these price-ordered
assortments are efficient, which to our knowledge is a new result. It implies that every price-ordered
assortment has a cost of capacity at which offering it to the current buyer is optimal.
Using virtual valuations to make online decisions. By defining virtual valuations for
Markov Chain choice models, our theory allows for any optimal stopping policy (more generally,
any k-secretary policy) to be converted into an online assortment policy. Indeed, by considering
what the stopping policy would have done in the virtual space, we can offer an assortment to
each buyer which has the same stopping probability and earns the same reward in expectation.
Therefore, any prophet inequality8 can be converted into an approximation guarantee for single-leg
online assortment problems under Markov Chain choice models.
For example, if the buyers arrive in a uniformly random order, then we can derive a 0.669-
approximate assortment policy, using the prophet inequality of Correa et al. (2019). We derive
similar results in the free order arrival model of Beyhaghi et al. (2018), where buyers can be
adaptively approached in any order. Our approximation algorithms (Section 5.2) are significant
for two reasons:
• Unlike the known-order model, the optimal policies for these arrival models cannot be exactly
found using dynamic programming;
• Our approximation ratio of 0.669 breaks the “barrier” of 1−1/e≈ 0.632, which represents the
best-possible approximation factor if one were to use the typical Choice-based Deterministic Linear
Program (CDLP) relaxation instead of the optimal assortment auction as the offline benchmark.
8 A prophet inequality is a bound c≤ 1 on the expected performance of an online stopping policy relative to an offline
“prophet” who knows the maximum value in advance. Since the values are the virtual valuations in this case, the
prophet’s value is the expected virtual surplus, which we showed is equal to the revenue of the optimal assortment
auction under Markov Chain choice models. Thus, the prophet inequality implies an approximation guarantee of c.
9Unified, generalized prophet inequalities. Our theory allows us to state guarantees
for online algorithms in the assortment setting, relative to the optimal assortment auction
(Section 5.3). This captures, as special cases of Markov Chain choice models, both:
• (i) guarantees for “sequential posted pricing” relative to Myerson’s optimal auction (in the special
case of buy-down preferences);
• (ii) guarantees for online accept-reject policies relative to a prophet’s offline value (in the special
case of single-minded buyers).
While the equivalence between (i) and (ii) has been previously known through transforming
instances back-and-forth (Chawla et al. 2010, Correa et al. 2018), we provide a single umbrella
which simultaneously implies both. Our umbrella also interpolates between (i) and (ii) using the
rich spectrum of Markov Chain choice models.
2. Literature Review
Since we believe the concept of assortment auctions is completely novel, we aim to fully survey
the neighboring streams of work from which this model was born. Assortment auctions borrow
elements from: mechanism design under ordinal preferences, (online) assortment optimization and
choice modeling, and revenue-maximizing auctions in a Bayesian setting.
Allocation Mechanisms under Ordinal Rankings. Mechanism design under ordinal pref-
erences has been used for many problems in social choice and two-sided matching markets
(Schummer and Vohra 2007). Most similar to our model is the house allocation problem of
Shapley and Scarf (1974), where items (houses) are allocated to agents when only one side of the
market (the agents) have ordinal preferences. In this model, each agent is initially endowed with
a house which they bring to the market. Under a stronger notion of truthfulness (being in the
strict core, which requires group strategyproofness), it is shown that there is only one feasible
mechanism. This mechanism can be implemented using top trading cycles (Roth 1982), and fur-
thermore, only imposing individual incentive-compatibility and rationality conditions along with
global pareto-optimality is enough to reduce the space of feasible mechanisms to this singularity
(Ma 1994). Pa´pai (2003) extends this mechanism for agents with multiple items. If the agents are
not initially endowed with items, a similar singularity result is established in Svensson (1999), and
the welfare attained by this mechanism (a serial dictatorship) is analyzed under different metrics
in Bhalgat et al. (2011).
Our paper largely differs from these in that it focuses on revenue maximization, and sidesteps
some of the impossibility/singularity results by not imposing any social desiderata.
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Assortment Optimization under Ordinal Rankings. Modeling substitution behavior as
customers having a distribution over ordinal rankings has its origins in Mahajan and Van Ryzin
(2001), Rusmevichientong et al. (2006). A key recent reference is Farias et al. (2013), who show
how to robustly estimate this distribution from data, as well as how to solve various revenue
optimization problems. We use “single-buyer assortment optimization” to refer to the problem
of computing one revenue-maximizing assortment to offer, given one ranking distribution which
is assumed to be exact (even though it may model a population of customers). Unfortunately,
for general ranking distributions, the single-buyer assortment optimization problem is NP-hard,
even to approximate within a sublinear factor (Aouad et al. 2018). Since our assortment auction
optimization problem with multiple buyers is a generalization, it inherits this negative result.
Fortunately though, single-buyer assortment optimization can be solved in polynomial time for
many classes of choice models where the ranking distributions are defined by a particular structure.
As first shown by Blanchet et al. (2016), this is indeed the case for the large class of Markov Chain
choice models, which contains the commonly-used class of Multi-Nomial Logit choice models. Our
paper takes the next step for Markov Chain choice models by solving for the optimal auction
when there are multiple buyers with different Markov chains. We should point out that single-
buyer assortment optimization can also be tractably solved for d-level nested logit (Li et al. 2015),
another large branch of choice models.
Finally, we note that the single-buyer assortment optimization problem has also been stud-
ied under other sub-classes of ranking distributions in Honhon et al. (2012), Aouad et al. (2015),
De´sir et al. (2016a,b), Feldman et al. (2019). The limit of how well ranking distributions can model
general customer substitution behavior is investigated in Jagabathula and Rusmevichientong
(2018).
Online Assortment with Multiple Buyers. The papers surveyed above focus on single-
buyer assortment optimization. Now we survey papers which have multiple buyers with different
ranking distributions, who can be offered personalized assortments. The seller has limited product
inventories, and must offer assortments to the buyers in an online fashion.
Starting with Golrezaei et al. (2014), best-possible competitive/approximation ratios have been
derived for many arrival models, including adversarial (Chen et al. 2016, Ma and Simchi-Levi
2017, Ma et al. 2018a), fixed-order non-IID (Gallego et al. 2016, Ma et al. 2018b,c, Lei et al.
2018), and IID (Ma et al. 2018b, Fata et al. 2019), in many cases with reusable resources
(Rusmevichientong et al. 2017, Gong et al. 2019, Baek and Ma 2019, Feng et al. 2019). The setup
in these papers tend to be more general than ours in two ways:
• The products have their own inventories, instead of sharing the same “single-leg” capacity;
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• They work with substitutable choice models (see Golrezaei et al. 2014), which is a superclass
of Markov Chain choice models.
Nonetheless, the conceptual relationship, that any of these online assortment policies for any of
the arrival models is a special case of a truthful assortment auction, still holds (see Section 5.2).
Therefore, even though we do not know how to compute the optimal assortment auction, it in
principle always leads to more revenue for the seller, and provides an upper bound (which is tighter
than the CDLP) on the revenue of on these assortment policies.
Bayesian Unit-demand Pricing. As mentioned at the start of the introduction, our assort-
ment auction problem where customers want at most one product can be contrasted with the
special case of combinatorial auctions where buyers are unit-demand. Study of Bayesian revenue-
maximizing auctions with unit-demand buyers is pioneered by Chawla et al. (2007, 2010, 2015),
and later unified in Cai et al. (2019). A key difference from our problem is that here, the seller can
set arbitrary payments to entice buyers to choose higher-valued products. Even the single-buyer
pricing problem in special cases is NP-hard (Chen et al. 2018). Moreover, since the buyer maxi-
mizes expectation with respect to cardinal valuations, randomized mechanisms are well-defined,
can outperform deterministic mechanisms by an unbounded factor (Briest et al. 2010), and may
require an exponential-sized description (Chen et al. 2015).
By avoiding the difficulties caused by arbitrary payments and randomized lotteries, we identify
a subclass of ranking distributions (Markov Chain choice models) where the optimal auction is
structured like Myerson (1981), and computable. We note that a common assumption in unit-
demand pricing is that a buyer’s valuations are independent across products, something not satisfied
by Markov Chain choice models (since the positions of products in the ranking are correlated).
3. Definition of Assortment Auctions
A seller has a set of products N = {1, . . . , n}. Each product j ∈ N has a fixed price rj, and the
products are indexed so that 0≤ r1 ≤ · · · ≤ rn. We also let j = 0 refer to a “no-purchase” product,
with r0 =0, which is always available. Throughout this paper, for an arbitrary subset of products
S ⊆N , we will let S+ denote the set S ∪{0}.
There is a set of buyers M = {1, . . . ,m}. Each buyer i∈M has a ranked list ℓi from which she is
willing to purchase at most one product, at its corresponding price. For example, the ranked list
(1,3) indicates that the buyer’s first choice is to purchase product 1 at price r1, second choice is to
purchase product 3 at price r3, and third choice is to make no purchase. The list omits product 0
and all the products ranked after it, since the ordering after product 0 is irrelevant. We let Ω
denote the universe of all possible lists, which are the ordered subsets of N .
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The ranked list can be interpreted as the set of products for which the buyer’s utility minus price
is positive, sorted in decreasing order. We overload notation and treat ℓi as both a set and a ranking,
where ℓi(j) denotes the rank of product j in list ℓi, with smaller numbers meaning more preferred.
We define ℓi(0) = |ℓi|+1 and ℓi(j) =∞ for all j ∈N \ ℓi. When presented with an assortment of
products S ⊆N , a buyer i chooses her most-preferred product from S+, i.e. argminj∈S+ ℓi(j).
We let ℓ= (ℓ1, . . . , ℓm) denote the list profile, which consists of all buyers’ ranked lists. We often
write ℓ as (ℓi,ℓ−i), where ℓ−i consists of all ranked lists except that of buyer i. A mechanism takes
in a list profile ℓ and outputs an allocation vector (j1(ℓ), . . . , jm(ℓ)) ∈ (N+)
m, where each buyer i
receives product ji(ℓ) and pays rji(ℓ).
We only consider deterministic mechanisms, because in our setting with ordinal preferences, a
buyer’s preference under uncertainty is not defined. Similarly, we only consider dominant-strategy
truthfulness, and say that a mechanism is truthful if
ℓi(ji(ℓi,ℓ−i))≤ ℓi(ji(ℓ
′
i,ℓ−i)) ∀i∈M,ℓ−i ∈Ω
m−1, ℓi ∈Ω, ℓ
′
i ∈Ω; (1)
ℓi(ji(ℓi,ℓ−i))≤ ℓi(0) ∀i∈M,ℓ−i ∈Ω
m−1, ℓi ∈Ω. (2)
(1) imposes that the mechanism is incentive-compatible, where a buyer i always receives a less-
preferred product when she misreports her list as ℓ′i instead of her true list ℓi. (2) imposes that
the mechanism is individually-rational, where a buyer i cannot be forced into purchasing a product
which is less-preferred to purchasing nothing.
Hereafter, we restrict to truthful mechanisms and make no distinction between a buyer’s reported
list and true list. We also assume that the lists are strictly ordered, where we note that the truth-
fulness constraints (1)–(2) are only easier to satisfy if we allow for indifference in the lists. The
following statement provides a useful characterization of all deterministic truthful mechanisms,
and is analogous to the “taxation principle” for classical auctions.
Proposition 1 (Taxation Principle for Assortment Auctions). Any deterministic truth-
ful mechanism can be characterized by functions Ti for the buyers i ∈M , where each Ti takes in
the other lists ℓ−i and outputs an assortment Ti(ℓ−i), such that the allocation vector satisfies
ji(ℓ) = argmin
j∈Ti(ℓ−i)+
ℓi(j) ∀i∈M. (3)
Proposition 1 is proven in Section A. Intuitively, it says that truthfulness is induced if and only if
each buyer i is allowed to choose from an assortment Ti(ℓ−i) which depends on only the competition
provided by the other buyers’ reports.
The seller requires a truthful mechanism where the allocation vector (j1(ℓ), . . . , jn(ℓ)) must
further satisfy the seller’s production feasibility constraints. The seller’s goal is to maximize his
revenue collected, equal to
∑n
i=1 rji(ℓ).
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3.1. Bayesian Single-item Revenue Maximization
Our paper assumes the Bayesian setting, where the seller has full distributional information about
the buyers’ private lists. We assume that the list of a buyer i is drawn independently from a
distribution over Ω, given by its discrete Probability Mass Function (PMF) Pi, which could be
different across buyers. In the Bayesian setting, we use ℓi to refer to the realized list of buyer i,
and l to refer to an arbitrary list in Ω, with Pr[ℓi = l] = Pi(l). We address how the PMF’s Pi over
the exponential space Ω can have compact representations when we discuss specific choice models
in Section 4.
Our paper also focuses on the single-item setting, where the auction can have at most one
“winner” who is allocated a non-zero product. More generally, our results hold under the constraint
{i∈M : ji(ℓ) 6= 0} ∈ F ∀ℓ∈Ω
m (4)
where F is an arbitrary downward-closed feasible family. We call this the “single-item” setting
because feasibility depends on only whether a buyer was allocated a product, and not which one;
this can be motivated by the single-leg revenue management problem from Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2004), where all of the products (Basic Economy, Economy, Economy Plus) consume the same
underlying “item” (seat on an airplane). It is important to note however, that a buyer who is a
“business traveler” could prefer a higher-priced product over a lower-priced product.
We are now ready to define the main problem studied in this paper.
Problem 1 (Revenue Maximization with Assortment Auctions). Find the allocation
functions j1, . . . , jm : Ω
m → N+ which maximize the expected revenue Eℓ[
∑m
i=1 rji(ℓ)], subject to
truthfulness constraints (1)-(2) and feasibility constraint (4).
In the case of a single buyer, Problem 1 reduces (via the taxation principle in Proposition 1) to
max
T1⊆N
Eℓ1 [rj1(ℓ1)] s.t. j1(ℓ1) = argmin
j∈T1∪{0}
ℓ1(j)
which is the basic assortment optimization problem.
We note that assortment optimization is NP-hard (in fact, NP-hard to approximate within any
sublinear factor) for general ranking distributions (Aouad et al. 2018), so our assortment auction
optimization problem inherits this negative result. Nonetheless, we can still hope to derive struc-
tural results and computational results under special classes of preference distributions.
3.1.1. Special case: buy-down preferences. We will frequently reference the special case
where customers “buy down”, because it corresponds to known results in the classical auctions set-
ting, which we can then build upon. In this special case, ranked lists always take the form (1, . . . , j),
for some product j ∈ N+, whose price rj corresponds to the customer’s maximum willingness-
to-pay. Therefore, we can consider an instance in the classical single-item auction setting where
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each buyer i has an independent valuation vi that equals rj with probability Pi
(
(1, . . . , j)
)
, for all
j ∈N+. Myerson’s optimal auction specifies an (ironed) virtual valuation function φi for each buyer
i, which maps the discrete valuation set {r0, . . . , rn} to R (Elkind 2007).
It is straight-forward to see that this can then can then be translated back into an optimal
assortment auction, in the special case of buy-down preferences.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the list distribution Pi for every buyer i is supported within
{(1, . . . , j) : j ∈N+} and that F = {M
′ ⊆M : |M ′| ≤ 1}. Then the optimal auction runs as follows:
• Each buyer i, upon reporting list (1, . . . , j), is assigned a virtual valuation of φi(rj);
• Declare the winner to be the buyer i∗ with the highest9 positive10 virtual valuation, and allocate
her the lowest-priced product j whose virtual valuation φi∗(rj) would have won the auction.
Furthermore, the optimal revenue is equal to the expected virtual surplus, defined as the expected
value of the maximum virtual valuation (or zero if all virtual valuations are non-positive).
We prove Proposition 2 in Section A by checking that an assortment auction under buy-down
preferences reduces to a classical auction. Nonetheless, Proposition 2 will also be a special case of
our general results in Section 4 for assortment auctions under Markov Chain choice models.
3.2. Implementable and Insurmountable Virtual Valuation Mappings
One way of interpreting Myerson’s result for classical auctions is that given any valuation distri-
butions, it is always possible to find functions φ1, . . . , φn which are simultaneously:
• “Low enough”, in that the expected virtual surplus (defined according to φ1, . . . , φn) can be
earned by a mechanism which truthfully allocates to the highest virtual valuation;
• “High enough”, in that the expected virtual surplus is an upper bound on the revenue of any
feasible truthful mechanism.
We will see in Section 3.3 that under general preference distributions, the two conditions above
cannot always be simultaneously satisfied. Nonetheless, in this section we derive what it means for
virtual valuations to be “low enough” and “high enough” in our assortment auctions setting.
For assortment auctions, the natural generalization of a function φ which maps valuations to
virtual valuations is a function V defined on lists.
Definition 1. A virtual valuation mapping (VVM) is a function V : Ω→ R. Given a VVM Vi
for every buyer i∈M and a downward-closed feasible family F , the expected virtual surplus is
Eℓ
[
max
M ′∈F
∑
i∈M ′
Vi(ℓi)
]
. (5)
9With discrete valuations, we can perturb the functions φ1, . . . , φm slightly so that different buyers cannot have the
same virtual valuation. This is equivalent to using an arbitrary deterministic tie-breaking rule.
10Only a positive virtual valuation can win the auction; otherwise no buyer is allocated any product.
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For convenience, a VVM Vi will often leave virtual valuations undefined for lists of measure zero.
The virtual valuation of the empty list ∅ is understood to be −∞, which can always be excluded
in the accounting of the virtual surplus since F is downward-closed.
We now introduce conditions on individual VVM’s V , omitting the buyer subscript i. In the
classical auctions setting, φ was a function defined based on a valuation distribution. Similarly, in
our setting, a VVM V is always defined based on a specific list distribution P .
Definition 2. Fix a list distribution P . For all assortments S ⊆N , define the following:
• Qj(S) = {l ∈Ω : j = argminj∈S+ l(j)}, the subset of lists l which choose product j when offered
assortment S, defined for all j ∈ S;
• Q(S) =
⋃
j∈SQ
j(S), the subset of lists l which make a purchase when offered assortment S;
• R(S) =
∑
j∈S rj ·P (Q
j(S)), the expected revenue when offering assortment S to distribution P ;
• Q(S) = P (Q(S)), the probability of getting a sale when offering assortment S to distribution P .
We now introduce the first of our two conditions on a VVM V for a distribution P .
Definition 3. We say that a virtual valuation mapping V for a distribution P is implementable
if for any threshold w ∈R, we can find an assortment S such that Q(S) = {l ∈Ω : V (l)≥w} and
∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)≤R(S). (6)
It can be checked that the virtual valuations defined for the example in Section 1.2 satisfy this
condition. Indeed, the relevant thresholds are w= 12,4,3,−1, and for each of these thresholds we
can find the respective assortments S = {A},{A,D},{A,B,D},{A,B,C,D} which satisfy (6) as
equality. Note that in Definition 3, it is important for V (∅) to be understood to be −∞, since the
empty list ∅ cannot lie in Q(S) for any assortment S.
If for every buyer, the VVM defined for her is implementable, then the virtual valuations are
“low enough” in the sense described earlier. The following lemma is proven in Section A.
Lemma 1. Suppose that VVM Vi is implementable for distribution Pi for all i∈M . Then revenue
equal to the expected virtual surplus (5) can be attained by a Myersonian mechanism, which on
each realization of ℓ offers assortments in a way so that buyers in argmaxM ′∈F
∑
i∈M ′ Vi(ℓi) are
allocated a non-zero product.
We will see in Section 3.3 that any VVM’s which maximally inflate the expected virtual surplus
correspond to the revenue frontier formed by efficient assortments. Moreover, if the revenue frontier
can be formed by nested assortments like in the example from Section 1.2, then these VVM’s are
implementable and the “maximal” expected virtual surplus can be attained. One may hope that
this means the Myersonian mechanism is optimal. Surprisingly though, it does not, which motivates
the need for the following second condition.
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Definition 4. We say that a virtual valuation mapping V for distribution P is insurmountable
if for all assortments S ⊆N ,
∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)≥R(S). (7)
The virtual valuations defined for the example in Section 1.2 are also insurmountable, although
this is much more difficult to check. In the special case of buy-down preferences, Q(S) always
corresponds to a contiguous block of lists exceeding some price threshold, and insurmountability
becomes a trivial condition, which is always satisfied by Myerson’s ironed virtual valuations. How-
ever, with general preference lists, there are exponentially many possibilities for Q(S), and whether
insurmountability holds depends on the specific substitution patterns across those preference lists.
In fact, an assortment S can violate (7) even when it is “inefficient” and has a small value of R(S),
especially if Q(S) contains many lists with low virtual valuations. And when (7) is violated, a
non-Myersonian mechanism can indeed surpass the expected virtual surplus.
Nonetheless, if for every buyer, the VVM defined for her is insurmountable, then the expected
virtual surplus cannot be surpassed. The following lemma is proven in Section A.
Lemma 2. Suppose that VVM Vi is insurmountable for distribution Pi for all i ∈M . Then the
expected virtual surplus (5) is an upper bound on the revenue of any feasible truthful mechanism.
Combining Lemmas 1–2, we see that if for each buyer we can find a VVM which is simultaneously
implementable and insurmountable, then a Myersonian mechanism is optimal.
3.3. Non-Myersonian Optimal Auctions and Revenue Frontiers
In this section, we relate our implementability and insurmountability conditions to the notion of
revenue frontiers and efficient assortments. It is not a prerequisite for deriving the optimal auction
under Markov Chain choice models, which is done in Section 4. However, this section motivates our
conditions and shows an example where the optimal auction cannot be implemented via virtual
valuations. Furthermore, the relationships established will allow us to use our optimal auction to
improve online assortment algorithms in Section 5.
Definition 5. Given a VVM V for the distribution P , consider V as a discrete random variable
which maps outcomes ℓ∈Ω to R, and let FV denote its CDF. Then the cumulative quantile curve
for the VVM V is defined to be the function
CQ
V (q) =
∫ q
0
(1−FV )
−1(t)dt (8)
over q ∈ [0,Q], where Q= 1−P (∅) (∅ denotes the empty list).
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In (8), (1−FV )
−1 is the quantile function for random variable V , which is piecewise constant and
decreasing, consisting of a finite number of descending line segments. We ignore the definition of
(1 − FV )
−1 at their breakpoints since this measure-zero set is ignored by the Riemann integral
in (8). We cut off the integral at Q because (1−FV )
−1(q) =−∞ for all q >Q, since V (∅) =−∞.
Finally, note that CQV (q) is a piecewise-linear concave curve starting from (0,0), since it is an
integral over a discrete decreasing function.
Definition 6. For the underlying distribution P , its revenue frontier is defined to be the func-
tion over q ∈ [0,Q] given by the value of the following optimization problem:
RF(q) =max
∑
S⊆N
R(S)αS
s.t.
∑
S⊆N
Q(S)αS = q
∑
S⊆N
αS = 1
αS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆N
The optimization problem for RF(q) is feasible for every q ∈ [0,Q], since Q(∅) = 0 and Q(N) =
1−P (∅) =Q. Note that there are only two equality constraints, hence an optimal solution needs
at most two non-zero variables. As a result, the revenue frontier RF(q) is also piecewise-linear
and concave, formed by joining points of the form (Q(S),R(S)) for assortments S, as discussed in
Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004)11.
Definition 7. 1. An assortment S ⊆ N is efficient if the point (Q(S),R(S)) lies on the
revenue frontier, i.e. if RF(Q(S)) =R(S).
2. A sequence of assortments S(0), . . . , S(K) forms the revenue frontier if RF(q) is formed by
connecting the points (Q(S(0)),R(S(0))), . . . , (Q(S(K)),R(S(K))) using line segments. Formally, this
requires the conditions that 0 =Q(S(0))≤ · · · ≤Q(S(K)) =Q, and if q= (1−α)Q(S(k−1))+αQ(S(k))
for some k=1, . . . ,K and α ∈ [0,1], then RF(q) = (1−α)R(S(k−1))+αR(S(k)).
3. A sequence of assortments S(0), . . . , S(K) is nested if S(0) ( · · ·( S(K).
Note that if S(0), . . . , S(K) forms the revenue frontier, then all of the assortments in S(0), . . . , S(K)
are efficient. However, there could be other efficient assortments outside of S(0), . . . , S(K). When the
revenue frontier can be formed by a nested sequence of assortments, there exists a “maximal” imple-
mentable VVM corresponding to the revenue frontier, as shown in the example from Section 1.2.
This is formalized in the series of lemmas below, which relate the cumulative quantile curves of
implementable and insurmountable VVM’s to RF(q). All proofs are presented in Section A.
11 We define our revenue frontier slightly differently from Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004), in that our curve can
decrease at the end. This is because our motivation is different—we would like to define virtual valuations, and the
negative slopes allow for negative virtual valuations, which is consistent with the literature in game theory.
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Lemma 3. The cumulative quantile curve for any implementable VVM lies below the revenue
frontier. That is, if V is implementable, then CQV (q)≤RF(q) for all q ∈ [0,Q].
Moreover, if the revenue frontier can be formed by a nested sequence of assortments, then there
exists an implementable VVM W with CQW (q) =RF(q) for all q ∈ [0,Q].
Lemma 4. The cumulative quantile curve for any insurmountable VVM lies above the revenue
frontier. That is, if V is insurmountable, then CQV (q)≥RF(q) for all q ∈ [0,Q].
Lemma 5. For a buyer i, suppose that there are two candidate VVM’s Vi andWi, with CQ
Vi(q)≤
CQ
Wi(q) for all q ∈ [0,Q] (under the buyer’s list distribution Pi). Then given any distributions Pi′
and VVM’s Vi′ to use for buyers i
′ 6= i, the expected virtual surplus (5) is greater using VVM Wi,
instead of VVM Vi, for buyer i.
Lemmas 3–4 imply that, for the goal of finding a VVM which is simultaneously implementable
and insurmountable, the only hope is to find one whose cumulative quantile curve coincides with
RF(q). The condition in Lemma 5 is referred to as random variable Wi stochastically majorizing
12
random variable Vi, and it implies that, for the goal of finding an implementable (resp. insur-
mountable) VVM which maximizes the revenue of the Myersonian mechanism from Lemma 1 (resp.
minimizes the upper bound from Lemma 2), it is better to choose Wi (resp. Vi) for buyer i under
any circumstances, regardless of the other buyers or the VVM’s used for them.
Thus, if a revenue frontier is formed by nested assortments, then one should always use the
implementable VVM W from Lemma 3 in a Myersonian mechanism, to maximize the expected
virtual surplus and hence the revenue. However, W may not be insurmountable, and it may be
possible to earn an even greater revenue using a non-Myersonian mechanism, as we now show.
Example 1 (Non-Myersonian Optimal Auction). There are four products A,B,C,D
with prices rA = 4, rB = 2, rC = rD = 1. There are two IID buyers, whose ranking distribu-
tions are uniform over lists (BA), (CBD), (B), (C), participating in a single-winner auction. For
this distribution, it can be checked that the revenue frontier is formed by nested assortments
{A},{A,B},{A,B,C}, which have respective sales probabilities 0.25,0.75,1 and expected revenues
1,1.5,1.5. Therefore, the VVM W defined byW (BA) = 4,W (CBD)=W (B) = 1,W (C) = 0, which
comes from the second part of Lemma 3, is implementable.
However, W is not insurmountable, because for assortment {A,C}, we have
∑
l∈Q({A,C})
W (l)P (l)= 1.25< 1.5 =R({A,C})
12 This is a strictly weaker property than (first-order) stochastic dominance, e.g. if W = 3,1 with probability 1/2 each
and V = 2 deterministically, then W stochastically majorizes V , but does not stochastically dominate it. Nonetheless,
stochastic majorization is sufficient to yield a higher expected virtual surplus under any circumstances.
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ℓ2 (BA) (CBD) (B) (C)
ℓ1 Ti(ℓ−i) {A} {A} {A,C} {A,B}
(BA) ∅ A A A B
(CBD) {A,D} A D C B
(B) {A,B} B B B B
(C) {A,C} A C C C
Figure 2 The optimal non-Myersonian mechanism for this example, which specifies the product allocated for
each possible combination of the buyers’ lists ℓ1, ℓ2. Bolded entries mean that buyer 1, the row player, wins;
non-bolded entries mean that buyer 2 wins. To see that the mechanism is truthful, the “taxation” assortments
Ti(ℓ−i) are shown; e.g. {A,D} means that when ℓ1 = (CBD), buyer 2 gets to choose from assortment {A,D}.
and hence inequality (7) is violated. Nonetheless, the best we can do with a Myersonian mechanism
is still to define virtual valuations for both buyers using W , earning expected virtual surplus
7 · 4+8 · 1
16
=
36
16
.
However, now consider the mechanism specified in Figure 2. It is feasible, truthful, and earns
5rA+6rB +4rC + rD
16
=
37
16
,
which is greater than the expected virtual surplus of any implementable VVM’s. It is easy to
see that this mechanism cannot be implemented using virtual valuations. Indeed, in Figure 2,
conditioned on both buyers’ lists being (B) or (C), buyer 2 wins if and only if buyer 1 reports the
same list. By contrast, in a Myersonian mechanism which maximizes virtual valuation, whether
buyer 2 wins must be determined by comparing a single number.
From our lemmas, we can also prove that the mechanism from Figure 2 is optimal. Indeed,
consider a slightly augmented VVM W defined by W (BA) = 4,W (CBD) =W (B) =W (C) = 1.
It can be checked that W is insurmountable. Using W to define the virtual valuations for both
buyers, the expected virtual surplus is 7·4+9·1
16
= 37
16
, which is an upper bound on the revenue of any
feasible truthful mechanism, by Lemma 2. Therefore, this mechanism is optimal. 
In Example 1, we saw that even with a nested sequence of assortments forming the revenue fron-
tier, the implementable VVM W was not insurmountable. That is, having such a nested sequence
was not sufficient for having an implementable and insurmountable VVM. In the next example we
show that it is also not necessary for having such a VVM.
Example 2 (Insurmountable and Implementable, but Not via Nested Assortments).
There are three products A,B,C with prices rA = 6, rB = 3, rC = 2. The ranking distribu-
tion is uniform over lists (BA), (CB), (B). It can be checked that the VVM V defined by
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V (BA) = 6, V (CB) = 2, V (B) = 1 is insurmountable. The conditions of implementability for V are
also satisfied, by setting S to be an assortment from the non-nested sequence ∅,{A},{A,C},{B}.
The revenue frontier is formed by these assortments, which have respective sales probabilities
0, 1
3
, 2
3
,1 and expected revenues 0,2, 8
3
,3. Moreover, it can be checked that the point ( 2
3
, 8
3
) on
the revenue frontier can only be attained by assortment {A,C}, while the point (1,3) can only
be attained by assortments {B} or {A,B}. There is no way to make the latter assortments a
superset of the former. Therefore, this distribution has a VVM which is both implementable and
insurmountable, even though the revenue frontier cannot be formed by nested assortments. 
Example 2 introduces an interesting curiosity. Suppose that a buyer’s list, drawn from this
distribution, realizes to (CB). If she is the only buyer in the auction, then she will be offered the
“reserve” assortment of {B}, getting her second choice of product B. However, if there is another
buyer such that a virtual valuation of 2 is required to win the auction, then she will be offered the
assortment of {A,C}, getting her first choice of product A! This shows that the optimal auction
can give a buyer a more-preferred allocation under increased competition, which is something that
cannot happen with the optimal auction in the classical Myersonian setting.
We conclude with one final, pathological example. In both examples seen so far, it was possible to
base virtual valuations off of the revenue frontier (as described in Section 1.2), because there existed
an implementable VVM whose cumulative quantile curve coincided with the revenue frontier.
However, such a VVM may not exist, in which case the Myersonian mechanism described in
Section 1.2 may not result in the winner purchasing a product, as we now show.
Example 3 (No Implementable VVM whose CQ Curve is Revenue Frontier).
There are three products A,B,C with prices rA = 25, rB = 15, rC = 12. The ranking distribution is
uniform over lists (BA), (CB), (B), (B), (C). It can be checked that the revenue frontier is defined
by the non-nested sequence of efficient assortments ∅,{A},{A,C},{A,B},{A,B,C}, which have
respective sales probabilities 0, 1
5
, 3
5
, 4
5
,1 and expected revenues 0, 5, 9.8, 12, 13.8.
For this example, trying to construct an implementable VVM V with CQV (q) = RF(q) for
all q ∈ [0,1] leads to a contradiction. The crux of the issue is that {A,B} follows {A,C}
in the sequence of efficient assortments, but Q({A,B}) = {(BA), (CB), (B)} is not a super-
set of Q({A,C}) = {(BA), (CB), (C)}. As a result, while normally one would use the efficient
assortments to satisfy implementability, in this case the sets Q(S) are not nested over S =
∅,{A},{A,C},{A,B},{A,B,C}, which makes it not possible to satisfy the condition Q(S) = {l ∈
Ω : V (l)≥w} for all w (as was possible in Examples 1–2).
Using the efficient assortments to define virtual valuations anyway, as described in Section 1.2,
we would get V
(
(BA)
)
= 5
1/5
=25, V
(
(CB)
)
= V
(
(C)
)
= 9.8−5
3/5−1/5
= 12, and V
(
(B)
)
= 12−9.8
4/5−3/5
=11.
To see that the resulting Myersonian mechanism may not award a product to the winner, suppose
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that the buyer’s realized list is (C), and that the highest virtual valuation among other buyers is 10.
This buyer would win the auction since her virtual valuation is 12, and she would be allocated her
most-preferred product from assortment {A,B}, whose corresponding slope is 11 (not assortment
{A,B,C}, whose corresponding slope is 9). Of course, this buyer with list (C) has no item of
interest in {A,B}, hence she must be allocated nothing in order to satisfy individual-rationality,
even though she had the highest virtual valuation which was non-negative. 
4. Optimal Assortment Auction under Markov Chain Choice Models
In this section we derive the optimal assortment auction under Markov Chain choice models.
To do so, we specify a procedure for defining a single buyer’s virtual valuation based on her
reported list and list distribution, and show that the resulting mapping is both implementable and
insurmountable. We omit the buyer subscript i in this section.
The Markov Chain choice model was introduced in Zhang and Cooper (2005), Blanchet et al.
(2016). We provide an equivalent definition below, which generates a ranked list of products instead
of a choice from a fixed assortment. We will show in Section 4.2.2 that the Markov Chain choice
model captures the special case of buy-down preferences discussed in Section 3.1.1.
Definition 8 (Markov Chain Choice Model). Under a Markov Chain choice model, the
list distribution P is implicitly defined in the following way. There is a Markov Chain with node
set N+ (recall that for any set S, we defined S+ = S ∪ {0}). For all nodes j ∈N and j
′ ∈N+, the
probability of transitioning from node j to node j′ is ρjj′ . The outgoing probabilities from every
node j ∈N satisfy
∑
j′∈N+
ρjj′ = 1, and 0 is a terminal node with no outgoing transitions.
To generate a list ℓ∈Ω according to distribution P , we start at each node j′ ∈N+ with probability
λj′ (these probabilities satisfy
∑
j′∈N+
λj′ = 1), in which case we start with the singleton list (j
′).
We then transition probabilistically along the Markov chain, adding every node visited to the end
of the list, but only if that node doesn’t already appear on the list. The list immediately ends
upon terminal node 0 being reached (and 0 is never added to the list). It is assumed that 0 is the
only absorbing state in the Markov chain, so that ℓ terminates with probability 1.
Definition 9 (Notation). In this section, we will use the following notation, which facilitates
the analysis of the Markov Chain choice model.
• For any S ⊆N , let S+ denote the set S+.
• For any j ∈N+, we will often use j to refer to the singleton set {j}.
• Consider the discrete probability space defined by the Markov Chain’s distribution P . For any
s∈N+ and S ⊆N+ \ s, let s≺ S denote the event that node s is visited before any of the nodes in
S, and let P[s≺ S] denote its probability.
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• Similarly, for any s ∈N , s′ ∈N+\s, and S ⊆N+\{s, s
′}, let P[s≺ s′≺ S] denote the probability
that s is visited before s′, which in turn is visited before any of the nodes in S. Let Ps[s
′ ≺ S]
denote the probability that starting from node s (instead of starting according to the probabilities
λk), s
′ is visited before any of the nodes in S. Note that
P[s≺ s′ ≺ S] = P[s≺ s′ ∪S]Ps[s
′ ≺ S],
by the memorylessness of the Markov chain.
• For s ∈N , s′ ∈N+ \ s, and S ⊆N+ \ {s, s
′}, let L(s≺ s′ ≺ S) denote the subset of lists l ∈Ω
for which s≺ s′ ≺ S. Note that although the list l is truncated upon reaching node 0, since s 6= 0,
whether s≺ s′ ≺ S is fully determined by l.
We are now ready to define our virtual valuation mapping V : Ω→R. Based on the distribution
P , our procedure constructs a sequence of products s(1), . . . , s(K), where each product s(k) maximizes
the incremental efficiency when added to assortment S(k−1) = {s(1), . . . , s(k−1)}. These efficiencies
are computed using externality-adjusted prices, which were introduced in De´sir et al. (2019). The
virtual valuation of a list l is then defined to be the incremental efficiency of the first product in
our sequence s(1), . . . , s(K) which appears in l.
Definition 10 (Procedure for Defining Virtual Valuations).
• Initialize assortment S(0) = ∅, and r(0)j = rj for all products j ∈N .
• For iterations k= 1,2, . . .
1. Set s(k) to be a product j ∈N \S(k−1) with Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)] 6=0 which maximizes the incremental
efficiency, defined as
r
(k−1)
j
Pj[0≺ S(k−1)]
. (9)
If there are no such products satisfying Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)] 6=0, then STOP.
2. Define the virtual valuation V (l) for every list l ∈ L(s(k) ≺ 0 ≺ S(k−1)) to be this maximum
incremental efficiency, equal to expression (9) with j = s(k).
3. Update the assortment after iteration k to be S(k) = S(k−1)∪{s(k)}, and update the externality-
adjusted prices for all remaining products j ∈N \S(k) to be
r(k)j = r
(k−1)
j − r
(k−1)
s(k)
Pj[s
(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ].
After the procedure stops, define K to be last iteration on which virtual valuations were defined,
i.e. K = |S(k)|, which is at most n.
Remark 1 (Validity of Procedure). Note that on each iteration k of the procedure:
• The lists with virtual valuations already defined contain some product in {s(1), . . . , s(k−1)}=
S(k−1);
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• The new lists for which virtual valuations are defined is L(s(k) ≺ 0 ≺ S(k−1)), which do not
contain any product in S(k−1), and hence do not conflict with existing definitions;
• When the procedure stops, all lists containing some product in S(K) have been covered.
Any non-empty lists whose virtual valuations remain undefined at the end must have j ≺ 0≺ S(K)
for some product j ∈N \ S(K). By the stopping criterion, Pj[0 ≺ S
(K)] = 0 for any such j, which
implies that P[j ≺ 0 ≺ S(K)] = 0. Therefore, the non-empty lists l ∈ Ω with V (l) undefined have
measure zero, and are inconsequential.
We now make several further remarks. Note that the procedure from Definition 10 does not
require knowing the values of λj′ , because it is only based on probabilities which start at a spe-
cific node j in the Markov chain. Also, these probabilities can be tractably computed using the
methodology described in Blanchet et al. (2016).
Nonetheless, if we fix any values of λ0, . . . , λn, then (9) can indeed be interpreted as the incre-
mental efficiency. Take an iteration k, where we are considering adding a product j ∈N \S(k−1) to
assortment S(k−1). The increase in sales probability, Q(S(k−1) ∪ j)−Q(S(k−1)), is the measure of
the lists in L(j ≺ 0≺ S(k−1)), which make a purchase with product j but did not make a purchase
without. The increase in revenue, R(S(k−1)∪j)−R(S(k−1)), is the externality-adjusted price, r(k−1)j ,
times the probability that j is chosen from assortment S(k−1) ∪ j, which is P[j ≺ S(k−1)+ ]. (We will
formally show this in Proposition 4, but this fact comes from De´sir et al. (2019).) Therefore,
R(S(k−1) ∪ j)−R(S(k−1))
Q(S(k−1) ∪ j)−Q(S(k−1))
=
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ S
(k−1)
+ ]
P[j ≺ 0≺ S(k−1)]
=
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ S
(k−1)
+ ]
P[j ≺ S(k−1)+ ]Pj[0≺ S(k−1)]
, (10)
which equals
r
(k−1)
j
Pj [0≺S
(k−1)]
, or equivalently expression (9).
Our virtual valuation generation procedure is different from the iterative assortment optimization
procedure of De´sir et al. (2019) in that at each iteration, it maximizes the incremental efficiency
R(S(k−1)∪j)−R(S(k−1))
Q(S(k−1)∪j)−Q(S(k−1))
=
r
(k−1)
j
Pj [0≺S
(k−1)]
, instead of the externality-adjusted price r
(k−1)
j . Their procedure
addresses the single-buyer problem under additional capacity and knapsack constraints. By con-
trast, our procedure addresses the unconstrained problem for multiple buyers, where the increase in
sales probability (corresponding to the term in our denominator) is highly relevant, as it prevents
allocations from being made to another buyer. The following example demonstrates our procedure
and the difference from their procedure.
Example 4 (Example of Procedure). There are four products A,B,C,D with prices rA =
6, rB =5, rC =4, rD = 3. The ranking distribution is uniform over lists (CBA), (CB), (CD), (D). It
is easy to see that this distribution is generated by the Markov chain pictured in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 The demonstration of our procedure from Definition 10 on Example 4. In the Markov chain, any
arrival probabilities λ or transition probabilities ρ not depicted are 0. In each iteration k, the highest incremental
efficiency (corresponding to expression (9)) as well as the product selected s(k) are shown.
Iterations k = 1,2,3 of the procedure are depicted in Figure 3, with the externality-adjusted
prices r
(k−1)
j shown on the nodes. In iteration k= 1, the highest-priced product A is selected, with
a corresponding virtual valuation of rA = 6.
In iteration k = 2, product B is selected by our procedure despite having a smaller externality-
adjusted price than product D, the product that would have been selected by the procedure from
De´sir et al. (2019). This is because in the denominator of (9), PB[0 ≺ S
(1)] = 1/2 while PD[0 ≺
S(1)] = 1. This reflects the fact that even though r
(1)
B < r
(1)
D and in fact R(S
(1) ∪B)<R(S(1) ∪D),
adding product B to the assortment S(1) = {A} increases sales probability by only 1/4, whereas
adding product D increases sales probability by 1/2.
In iteration k= 3, our procedure selects product D and then stops. Even though the assortment
S(3) = {A,B,D} does not contain product C, the stopping criterion PC [0≺ S
(3)] = 0 is met. It can
also be checked that r(3)C = r
(2)
C − r
(2)
D PC [D≺ S
(2)] =−1/3, which is negative.
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4.1. Implementability and Insurmountability of Procedure
We now build toward showing that the virtual valuation mapping V : Ω→R constructed in Defini-
tion 10 is both implementable and insurmountable. Most formal proofs are deferred to Section B.
Definition 11. Consider the procedure from Definition 10.
1. For a list ℓ, let κ(ℓ) denote the index of the first product in sequence s(1), . . . , s(K) to appear in
ℓ, which is well-defined in {1 . . . ,K} (see Remark 1) as long as ℓ 6= ∅ and has positive measure.
2. For all k = 1, . . . ,K, let V (k) denote the virtual valuation of lists ℓ with κ(ℓ) = k, equal to
expression (9) with j = s(k). Note that if Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1)) 6= 0 (which is not guaranteed by
the condition Ps(k) [0 ≺ S
(k−1)] 6= 0 from the procedure), then V (k) can be interpreted as the
incremental efficiency in (10), with V (k) = R(S
(k))−R(S(k−1))
Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1))
.
Proposition 3. Every product j ∈N falls under one of the following two categories:
1. j = s(k) for some iteration k= 1, . . . ,K, in which case for all k′ >k,
V (k
′) ≤ V (k);
2. j /∈ S(K), in which case there is some iteration k for which Pj[0≺ S
(k)] = 0< Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)], with
0≥ r(k)j = r
(k+1)
j = · · ·= r
(K)
j .
The dichotomy identified in Proposition 3 is important for our analysis. The key observation in
its proof is that at each iteration k, by adding the most efficient product s(k) to the assortment
S(k−1), the efficiencies of the other products can only go down. This leads to the first statement in
Proposition 3, which says that the virtual valuations defined by our procedure are non-increasing,
i.e. V (1) ≥ · · · ≥ V (K). Note that these virtual valuations can eventually be negative.
The second statement in Proposition 3 says that any product which never gets added to the
assortment in our procedure must have been “killed” at some iteration k, where Pj[0 ≺ S
(k)]
decreased to 0 after s(k) was added. It says that the externality-adjusted revenue r
(k)
j must be
non-positive at the end of this iteration k, and moreover, never changes again from future updates.
These products j ∈N \S(K) which are not added by the end can be interpreted to have a virtual
valuation of −∞, since in (9), the numerator r(K)j ≤ 0, and the denominator Pj[0≺ S
(K)] = 0.
As noted before, the procedure from Definition 10 does not depend on the values of λ0, . . . , λn,
and hence neither do the statements in Proposition 3. Now we establish some statements about
the true revenues R(S) of assortments S, which do depend on these values. These statements, in
conjunction with Proposition 3, will allow us to establish implementability and insurmountability.
Proposition 4. For any k =0,1, . . . ,K and S ⊆N \S(k),
R(S(k) ∪S)−R(S(k)) =
∑
j∈S
r
(k)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k) ∪S \ j)+].
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Proposition 4 can be derived from De´sir et al. (2019), where the term on the RHS can be interpreted
as the revenue of assortment S on an “externality-adjusted instance”, in which products j ∈ S(k)
have been made equivalent to the buyer choosing the zero-revenue no-purchase option, and products
j /∈ S(k) have had their prices replaced by r(k)j .
Proposition 5. For any k =0,1, . . . ,K, we have that R(S(k)) =
∑
l∈Q(S(k)) V (l)P (l).
Proposition 5 is built upon Proposition 4, and says that for any of the assortments S(k), its revenue
matches the “integral” of the virtual surplus,
∑
l∈Q(S(k)) V (l)P (l), over lists l which make a purchase
from S(k). Having derived Proposition 5, we are now ready to establish implementability.
Corollary 1 (Implementability). The VVM V constructed for list distribution P by Defi-
nition 10 is implementable.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Proposition 3, the virtual valuations defined satisfy V (1) ≥ · · · ≥ V (K).
Therefore, for any threshold w ∈R, the set {l ∈Ω : V (l)≥w} takes the form {l ∈Ω : κ(l)≤ k} for
some k = 0,1, . . . ,K. By construction in Definition 10, assortment S(k) has the desired Q(S(k)).
Moreover, by Proposition 5, condition (6) on R(S(k)) is satisfied as equality, as desired. 
In Corollary 1, the assortments used to satisfy the condition of implementability happen to
be nested in that S(0) ( · · · ( S(K). However, even with this stronger property, implementability
does not establish insurmountability, as discussed in Section 3.3. Instead, the following theorem
establishes insurmountability from first principles, making use of all of Propositions 3–5 along the
way. Its proof is motivated by showing that the bad example (Example 1) from Section 3.3 cannot
arise under Markov Chain choice models.
Theorem 1 (Insurmountability). The VVM V constructed for list distribution P by Defini-
tion 10 is insurmountable; that is, R(S)≤
∑
l∈Q(S) V (l)P (l) for all assortments S ⊆N .
By Corollary 1 and Theorem 1, every Markov Chain choice model has a VVM which is simul-
taneously implementable and insurmountable, and tractably computable from Definition 10. Our
main result for Markov Chain choice models now immediately follows from Lemmas 1–2.
Theorem 2. Under Markov Chain choice models, the optimal assortment auction is a compu-
tationally tractable Myersonian mechanism, and its revenue equals the expected virtual surplus.
For concreteness, we describe the optimal mechanism in the single-winner setting where F = {M ′ ⊆
M : |M ′| ≤ 1}:
• For each buyer i= 1, . . . ,m, run the procedure from Definition 10 on her list distribution Pi, to
obtain a virtual valuation mapping Vi and assortments S
(0)
i , . . . , S
(Ki)
i ;
• Elicit reports ℓ1, · · · , ℓm from the buyers, and assign each buyer i a virtual valuation of Vi(ℓi);
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• Declare the winner to be the buyer i∗ with the highest positive virtual valuation (or no winner
if all virtual valuations are non-positive);
• Allocate buyer i∗ her most-preferred product from assortment S(k)i∗ , where k is the largest index
in 1, . . . ,Ki for which virtual valuation V
(k)
i∗ would have made buyer i
∗ the winner.
For general downward-closed constraints F on the set of winners, we refer to the proof of Lemma 1
for the description of the optimal mechanism.
4.2. Revenue Frontiers and Special Cases of Markov Chain Choice Models
In this section, we use the relationships from Section 3.3 to show that the assortments in the
procedure from Definition 10 form the revenue frontier for Markov Chain choice models. We also
consider what the procedure and these assortments look like for special cases of Markov Chain
choice models. The revenue frontier will be used for online assortment problems in Section 5.
Corollary 2. The nested sequence of assortments S(0) ( · · ·( S(K), which are tractably com-
puted in Definition 10, form the revenue frontier for any Markov Chain choice model.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider the VVM V defined for the Markov Chain choice model by our
procedure from Definition 10. By Theorem 2, V is both implementable and insurmountable. It
follows from Lemmas 3–4 that CQV (q)≤ RF(q) ≤ CQV (q), and hence CQV (q) coincides with the
revenue frontier RF(q) for all q ∈ [0,Q].
Now, the assortments S(0), . . . , S(K) fromDefinition 10 are clearly nested and satisfy 0 =Q(S(0))≤
· · · ≤Q(S(K)) =Q. Moreover, if q= (1−α)Q(S(k−1))+αQ(S(k)) for some k≥ 1 and α ∈ [0,1], then
RF(q) =CQV (q) =
∫ q
0
(1−FV )
−1(t)dt=
∑
k′<k
V (k
′)(Q(S(k
′))−Q(S(k
′−1)))+V (k)(q−Q(S(k−1)))
=
∑
k′<k
V (k
′)(Q(S(k
′))−Q(S(k
′−1)))+αV (k)(Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1)))
= (1−α)R(S(k−1))+αR(S(k))
where the evaluation of the integral in the first line requires the first statement of Proposition 3,
and the final equality requires Proposition 5. These equalities complete the proof. 
4.2.1. Special case: Multi-Nomial Logit choice models. In the special case where the
Markov Chain choice model is a Multi-Nomial Logit choice model (see McFadden 1973), we provide
a refined description of our procedure and closed-form formulas for the virtual valuations.
Definition 12 (Multi-Nomial Logit (MNL) Choice Model). Under MNL, the list dis-
tribution P is generated according to a vase model (see Plackett 1975, Luce 1959). Each product
j ∈N+ has a weight uj > 0, with u0 normalized to 1 by convention. Now, imagine a vase containing
a number of balls of color j proportional to uj, for all j ∈N+. At each stage, a ball is sampled with
replacement from the vase, and its color is added to the list, if its color doesn’t already appear in
the list. The list terminates upon a ball of color 0 being sampled.
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An MNL choice model is captured by a Markov chain choice model, if for all nodes j′ ∈N+, we
set arrival probability λj′ and all incoming transition probabilities ρ1j′ , . . . , ρnj′ equal to
uj′∑
j∈N+
uj
.
Note that in such a Markov chain, the transition probability depends on only the destination node.
Proposition 6. Under an MNL choice model, our procedure from Definition 10 always takes
n iterations, and adds the products in the order n, . . . ,1 of decreasing prices. Moreover, the virtual
valuation of a list is determined by the highest-priced product on that list, and if this product is
j > 0, then the virtual valuation is
rj −
n∑
j′=j+1
(rj′ − rj)uj′ . (11)
Proposition 6 is proven in Section B. In (11), the term (rj′−rj)uj′ can be interpreted as the revenue
loss from product j cannibalizing the sales of higher-priced product j′.
Corollary 3. Under an MNL choice model, the revenue frontier is formed by assortments
∅( {n}( {n− 1, n}( · · ·( {1, . . . , n}.
Corollary 3 is a refinement of Corollary 2 in the special case of MNL, and follows directly from the
first part of Proposition 6. It has been known since Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) that under MNL,
the efficient assortments take the form {j, . . . , n} for some j = 1, . . . , n+ 1. However, Corollary 3
makes the stronger claim that all assortments taking this form are efficient, which to our knowledge
is a new result. This is particularly surprising in the assortment auctions context, because it says
that under MNL, the virtual valuations (11) are monotonic over all the prices j.13 By contrast,
even in the classical auctions setting, the virtual valuations must omit inefficient prices (“iron
irregular demand”) in order to satisfy monotonicity, which we discuss next.
4.2.2. Special case: buy-down preferences. We revisit the special case of buy-down pref-
erences discussed in Section 3.1.1, where the distribution for every buyer is supported over lists
of the form (1, . . . , j). For all j = 1, . . . , n, let P (j) be shorthand for P
(
(1, . . . , j)
)
, and assume for
notational simplicity that all of these probabilities are strictly positive, with P (1)+ · · ·+P (n) = 1.
This list distribution arises from the Markov Chain choice model given by:
ρj,0 =
P (j)
P (j)+ · · ·+P (n)
, ρj,j+1 = 1−
P (j)
P (j)+ · · ·+P (n)
∀j = 1, . . . , n− 1; (12)
ρn,0 = 1; λ1 = 1
13 This does not quite imply that MNL choice models correspond to regular demand distributions, since regu-
lar distributions need to be continuous. MNL only satisfies the weaker notion of “discrete regularity” proposed in
Elkind (2007). Nonetheless, this could potentially be remedied by defining MNL over a continuum of products (see
Peeters et al. 2018).
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(where all unspecified values of ρ and λ are 0). Indeed, for any j = 1, . . . , n, the probability of the
Markov chain generating list (1, . . . , j) is
λ1
( j−1∏
j′=1
ρj′,j′+1
)
ρj,0 = 1
( j−1∏
j′=1
P (j′+1)+ · · ·+P (n)
P (j′)+ · · ·+P (n)
) P (j)
P (j)+ · · ·+P (n)
=
P (j)
P (1)+ · · ·+P (n)
which equals P (j) since P (1)+ · · ·+P (n) = 1.
In (12), the expression P (j)
P (j)+···+P (n)
can be interpreted as the hazard rate, which is the probability
of the list terminating with product j, conditioned on it containing product j. The hazard rates
are encoded in the values of ρ. Although our virtual valuations in Definition 10 make use of only
the values of ρ, the values of λ for buy-down preferences are trivial, and hence our procedure is
actually using all the information about the distribution, making it consistent with the definition
of ironed virtual valuations from the classical auctions setting. We formalize this below.
Proposition 7. Under buy-down preferences, our procedure from Definition 10 is equivalent
to the ironing procedure from Elkind (2007), which finds the efficient price points and constructs
virtual valuations for arbitrary discrete distributions.
Proposition 7 is proven in Section B. It confirms that assortment auctions for Markov Chain choice
models indeed generalizes classical single-item auctions, since in the special case of buy-down pref-
erences, the optimal assortment auction reduces to Myerson’s optimal auction from Proposition 2.
4.2.3. Special case: independent demand model (where buyers are single-minded).
Finally, we mention the special case of the independent demand model, where each buyer’s dis-
tribution is supported over lists of the form (j). Such a list represents a “single-minded” buyer
who is only interested in purchasing a single product j ∈N . Any such list distribution is captured
by a Markov Chain choice model with trivial transition probabilities ρj,0 = 1 for all j ∈ N (and
ρj,j′ = 0 for all j
′ 6=0). Since our procedure for constructing virtual valuations depends on only the
transition probabilities ρ, it also ends up being rather trivial.
Proposition 8. Under the independent demand model, the externality-adjusted prices are
always identical to the original prices. Therefore, our procedure from Definition 10 adds the products
in the order n, . . . ,1 of decreasing original prices, and the virtual valuation of list (j) is rj.
Proposition 8 is immediate from Definition 10. Note that although the virtual valuation mapping
is identical across buyers, their list distributions could of course differ, with non-identical arrival
probability vectors λ across their Markov chains. The independent demand model corresponds to
the accept-reject problem studied in prophet inequalities, and will be useful in Section 5.
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5. Online Assortment Problems under Markov Chain Choice Models
In this section we consider several variants of the online assortment problem under Markov Chain
choice models. Using the structure of the optimal assortment auction (from Section 4) and its rela-
tionship to the revenue frontier (from Section 3.3), we improve online policies and approximation
guarantees for these problems, and also provide a generalized notion of prophet inequalities.
First we formally define these problems. Recall that in our general setup, there are n products
with prices r1 ≤ · · · ≤ rn; m buyers with lists drawn independently from distributions P1, . . . , Pm
which are represented by Markov chains; and a downward-closed family F consisting of feasible
subsets of buyers. In the online assortment problem, the buyers arrive sequentially, and are each
offered an assortment, from which they immediately purchase their most-preferred product (possi-
bly none) according to their realized list. The set of buyers who make a purchase is constrained to
lie in F . The seller can offer a buyer i an empty assortment, which is his only option if i violates
feasibility, i.e. i in conjunction with the buyers who have already made a purchase does not lie in
F . The objective is to maximize the expected revenue using an online policy, which must decide
on the assortments to offer the buyers in the order they arrive (by contrast, an assortment auction
can elicit lists from all the buyers before making any offerings). The different variants of the online
assortment problem are determined by the order in which buyers arrive.
Problem 2 (Online Assortment with Fixed-order Arrivals). Find an online policy to
maximize expected revenue, when the buyers arrive in known order 1, . . . ,m.
Problem 3 (Online Assortment with Random-order Arrivals). Find an online policy
to maximize expected revenue, when the buyers are known to arrive in a uniformly random order.
Problem 4 (Online Assortment with Free-order Arrivals). Find an online policy to
maximize expected revenue, when the seller can adaptively select the order of arrival.
Note that if the distributions from which buyer lists are drawn are identical, i.e. P1 = · · ·= Pm,
then order does not matter and Problems 2–4 are equivalent.
5.1. Optimal Policy for Fixed-order Arrivals
In this section we derive the optimal policy for Problem 2 when F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ b}. This is
equivalent to the single-leg revenue management problem where there are b seats on a flight leg,
they are sold at n different fares, and Markov chains model the demand for these fares over m
time steps. Since the order of buyers is fixed, we consider buyer i to be arriving at “time i”, for all
i= 1, . . . ,m.
This problem’s state space is O(mb), because at each time i = 1, . . . ,m, the state is fully cap-
tured by how many of the seats have been used up, or alternatively, how much seat inventory
a ∈ {0, . . . , b} remains. Therefore, it can be optimally solved using dynamic programming, if the
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required assortment optimization problem in each state can be tractably solved, as is done so via
linear programming in Feldman and Topaloglu (2017).
The problem and solution we present differs in two ways. First, we explicitly construct the small
number of efficient assortments that have be checked across the states for each time i, by running
our procedure from Definition 10 on the distribution Pi for each time i. Second, we consider the more
general setting of non-identical distributions P1, . . . , Pm over time, whereas Feldman and Topaloglu
(2017) assume that P1 = · · ·=Pm.
Definition 13. For all i=1, . . . ,m+1 and a= 0, . . . , b, let Ji(a) denote the value-to-go, which
is the expected revenue earned by the optimal policy from the start of time i with remaining
inventory a. For all i < m+ 1 and a > 0, refer to Ji+1(a)− Ji+1(a− 1) as the value of inventory,
which is the loss in future revenue if one of a remaining units is sold during time i.
Theorem 3. The single-leg revenue management problem under (non-identical) Markov Chain
choice models can be tractably solved as follows:
1. For each time i= 1, . . . ,m, run the procedure from Definition 10 on the distribution Pi to obtain
a nested sequence of efficient assortments S
(0)
i ( · · ·( S
(Ki)
i ;
2. Solve the dynamic programming using backward induction, where for each i=m, . . . ,1 and state
corresponding to time i, only the assortments S
(0)
i , . . . , S
(Ki)
i are considered by the policy.
Moreover, the optimal policy satisfies the following structural properties:
1. At any time i= 1, . . . ,m, a larger value of inventory causes the optimal policy to offer a smaller
(i.e., earlier) assortment from the sequence S
(0)
i , . . . , S
(Ki)
i , and moreover, any assortment in the
sequence has a value of inventory at which it is an optimal assortment to offer;
2. In the special case of MNL, this sequence is ∅,{n},{n− 1, n}, . . . ,{1, . . . , n} for every buyer i.
Theorem 3 is proven in Section C, but straight-forward to establish given our developments from
Sections 3–4. The sufficiency of considering assortments S(0)i , . . . , S
(Ki)
i and the monotonicity with
respect to the value of inventory follow from these assortments forming the concave revenue frontier
(Corollary 2). The second structural property is just a restatement of Corollary 3. Combining it
with the first structural property, we obtain the following refined results under MNL: the optimal
assortment always takes the form {j, . . . , n}, and moreover, any such assortment has a value of
inventory at which it is optimal. While the first result has been known since Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2004), the second result is a new understanding brought by this paper.
5.2. Approximate Policies for Random-order and Free-order Arrivals
In this section we derive approximation algorithms for Problems 3 and 4. Note that with random-
order or free-order arrivals, the optimal online policy can no longer be easily found through dynamic
programming, as the state space would be exponential.
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We use the optimal assortment auction as an upper bound for the optimal online assortment
policy, and establish approximation guarantees strictly exceeding 1− 1/e when F takes the form
{M ′ : |M ′| ≤ b}. Previous papers have instead used the Choice-based Deterministic Linear Program
(CDLP) as an upper bound, relative to which it is impossible to exceed the approximation ratio
of 1− 1/e when F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ 1}. We elaborate on this impossibility in Section D, but it shows
that just the concept of an assortment auction is useful as a benchmark for other problems.
The results in this section require our developments for Markov Chain choice models from Sec-
tion 4. Hereafter, we assume that for any buyer i and list ℓi, her virtual valuation Vi(ℓi) is always
assigned according to Definition 10.
Lemma 6. Any possibly randomized online assortment policy (for any of the Problems 2–4) can
be described as a distribution over truthful assortment auctions (as defined in Problem 1).
Therefore, under Markov Chain choice models, the expected revenue of any online assortment
policy is at most the expected virtual surplus given in expression (5).
Lemma 6 is formally proven in Section C, but conceptually very simple, and analogous to the fact
that Sequential Posted Pricing forms a special subclass of mechanisms in the classical auctions
setting (Chawla et al. 2010). Indeed, any online assortment policy, which in some order offers an
assortment to each buyer to choose from, can be simulated by first asking each buyer for her list and
then choosing her most-preferred product for her. Since each buyer is offered only one assortment
which she has no control over, she is fully incentivized to report her true list. As a result, online
assortment policies can be interpreted as the subclass of truthful assortment auctions which make
offerings to the buyers sequentially, instead of simultaneously. Finally, for Markov Chain choice
models, the expected revenue of truthful assortment auctions is upper-bounded by the expected
virtual surplus (Theorem 2).
To find an online policy which extracts a guaranteed fraction of the expected virtual surplus, we
turn to prophet inequalities. Prophet inequalities consider the following modified problem: suppose
that each buyer, instead of being offered an assortment upon arrival, simply reveals her true virtual
valuation upon arrival and is then irrevocably accepted or rejected; if accepted, revenue equal to
her virtual valuation is earned. The goal is to design online accept-reject policies which guarantee
a certain fraction of the expected value earned by a prophet, who sees all of the realized virtual
valuations in advance and can make optimal accept-reject decisions. In our modified problem, the
prophet’s value is exactly the expected virtual surplus given in (5), because the prophet selects,
offline, the feasible set M ′ ∈F maximizing
∑
i∈M ′ Vi(ℓi) on any realization of ℓ1, . . . , ℓm.
Lemma 7. Suppose that we are given an online accept-reject policy for the prophet-inequality
problem (with either fixed-order, random-order, or free-order arrivals). Under Markov Chain choice
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models, this can be tractably translated into an online assortment policy whose expected revenue in
the online assortment problem equals that of the accept-reject policy in the modified problem.
Lemma 7 is proven in Section C, but also conceptually very simple. For every buyer, the accept-
reject policy’s decision can be reduced to a single threshold above which the buyer’s virtual val-
uation is accepted. By the implementability condition of our virtual valuations for Markov Chain
choice models, any such threshold can be translated into an assortment to offer which yields the
exact same expected revenue and sales probability. As a result, the revenues earned by the assort-
ment policy, when executed on the assortment problem, can be coupled with the revenues earned
by the accept-reject policy in a way to show that their expectations are the same.
With Lemmas 6–7 in place, our approximation algorithms for the online assortment problems
now follow from existing prophet inequalities for random-order and free-order arrivals.
Theorem 4. Under Markov Chain choice models, Problem 3 (random-order arrivals) with feasi-
ble family F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ 1} has a computationally tractable online policy whose expected revenue
is at least 0.669 times that of the optimal online policy.
Proof of Theorem 4. By Lemma 7, an online assortment policy can be tractably computed from
the online accept-reject policy in Correa et al. (2019). Since this online accept-reject policy earns
at least 0.669 times the prophet’s value, the online assortment policy’s expected revenue is least
0.669 times the expected virtual surplus. By Lemma 6, the expected virtual surplus is an upper
bound on the expected revenue of any online assortment policy, completing the proof. 
Theorem 5. Under Markov Chain choice models, Problem 4 (free-order arrivals) with any fea-
sible family of the form F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ b} has a computationally tractable online policy whose
expected revenue is strictly greater than 1− b
b
b!eb
times that of the optimal online policy.
Proof of Theorem 5. Follows similarly from Lemmas 6–7 and the prophet inequalities for free-
order arrivals and feasible families F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ b} established in Beyhaghi et al. (2018). 
Theorem 4 has the best-known approximation ratio when F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ 1}, which holds with
random-order arrivals. Theorem 5 allows the policy to choose the order of arrivals, and its approx-
imation ratio improves to 1 as b→∞. We defer the exact values of the ratio to Beyhaghi et al.
(2018), but the significance is that it strictly exceeds 1− b
b
b!eb
, which could not have been possible
without the concept of Myerson’s optimal auction. Analogously, Theorems 4–5 could not have been
possible without the concept of the optimal assortment auction, and previous papers using the
CDLP are stuck at the ratios of 1− 1/e≈ 0.632 and 1− b
b
b!eb
respectively—see Section D.
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5.3. A Unified, Generalized notion of Prophet Inequalities
Section 5 showed how to convert any prophet inequality into a performance guarantee for online
assortment policies relative to the optimal assortment auction, for Markov Chain choice models. In
this section, we show that such a guarantee simultaneously captures guarantees for online accept-
reject policies and online pricing policies, as two special cases of Markov Chain choice models.
Accept-reject and pricing are the two canonical cases studied in prophet inequalities, and the
equivalence of their guarantees has been previously derived through transforming back-and-forth
between their instances (Chawla et al. 2010, Correa et al. 2018). Nonetheless, the concept of assort-
ment auctions provides a single umbrella which simultaneously implies guarantees for both sets of
instances, as well as a rich spectrum of choice models in-between.
Theorem 6. Consider any performance guarantee for Markov Chain choice models, where the
revenue of an online assortment policy (under fixed, random, or free-order arrivals) is at least
c ·Eℓ[max
M ′∈F
∑
i∈M ′
Vi(ℓi)], (13)
with c≤ 1 and the virtual valuations Vi(ℓi) as defined in Definition 10.
In the special case of buy-down preferences, the online assortment policy reduces to deciding
on the price in {r1, . . . , rn,∞} to offer each buyer, and the guarantee (13) reduces to c times the
revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction.
In the special case of the independent demand model, the online assortment policy reduces to
deciding on whether to accept each buyer after seeing her willingness-to-pay in {0, r1, . . . , rn}, and
the guarantee (13) reduces to c times the expected value earned by a prophet.
Proof. With buy-down preferences, any assortment decision S is equivalent to offering only
the lowest-priced product in S, or offering price ∞ if S = ∅. Meanwhile, by Proposition 7, the
expectation in (13) equals the expected ironed virtual surplus from the classical auctions setting,
which is attained by Myerson’s optimal auction.
With the independent demand model, any assortment decision S is equivalent to committing
to accepting the buyer should her list consist of a product in S. This is equivalent to first seeing
the buyer’s single product of interest, and then deciding to accept her if and only if it lies in S.
Meanwhile, the prophet sees every buyer’s product of interest in advance, and accepts the feasible
subset M ′ ∈ F whose products of interest has the highest sum of prices. By Proposition 8, the
expected value of the prophet equals exactly the expectation in (13), completing the proof. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we introduce the concept of an assortment auction, whose salient features are:
• the products/services being sold have fixed prices;
• agents compete for a limited supply of these products in an auction.
The combination of fixed prices and auctions is what makes our concept novel. We now propose
some practical settings where an assortment auction would be useful.
In general, an auction is the best format for selling scarce, luxury items such as antiques and
paintings, whose demand is thin and uncertain. However, asking for agents to decide on an exact
dollar amount in an auction places a heavy cognitive burden. To simplify things, some industries
sell luxury items in packages with fixed prices instead (e.g. VIP packages at a pop concert; vacation
packages to a private resort). However, by selling these packages on a first-come-first-serve basis, the
“simultaneity” power of an auction, of seeing all agents’ preferences and making a global allocation,
is lost.
An assortment auction sells these pre-determined packages in an auction, which gets the both
worlds. On one hand, it is easy for an agent to rank the small number of packages she is interested
in. On the other hand, agents are fully incentivized to report all packages of interest, including
those that are not a first choice, and hence the auction can make a more efficient allocation. In the
examples above, our single-leg assumption is also reasonable, because there is usually one limiting
resource (e.g. time with the popstar, or front-row seats; lodgings at the resort) which is contained
in every package.
All in all, the optimal assortment auction represents the best mechanism in theory14 in the
broad setting of selling fixed-price products to ordinal-preference agents. Our paper develops the
theoretical underpinnings of such a mechanism in a Bayesian setting, assuming single-leg capacity
constraints and deterministic auctions. Of course, there are many possible directions for future
theory to be developed, which would open the door for further applications. We list some below:
• Our theory considers a Bayesian setting where the optimal mechanism depends intimately on
the given distributions. However, there is no reason why a prior-free assortment auction cannot
exist. Indeed, one could easily specify the equivalent of a Vickrey 2nd-price Auction (which is
distribution-independent) in the assortment setting, where the ordering of prices may or may not
follow the fixed revenues of the products.
• Allocation mechanisms with one-sided ordinal preferences, as we studied, are currently imple-
mented in markets such as house and organ allocation. Our setting differs in that it assigns a
14 This is formalized in Lemma 6.
36
cardinal “score” (which we call “revenue”) to each product-agent pair15, which may not be consis-
tent with the agent’s ordinal ranking, and aims to maximize the score in its allocations. It would
be interesting to contrast our setting with these matching markets. We should point out though,
that our single-leg assumption is usually invalid when it comes to houses/organs.
• In this paper we restricted to deterministic mechanisms to avoid defining how an ordinal agent
behaves under uncertainty, but such definitions do exist (see Chakrabarty and Swamy 2014). This
is useful because in some settings (e.g., for VIP time with the popstar), a randomized lottery may
actually be desirable. Also, there is the notion of an opaque product (Elmachtoub and Wei 2015,
Elmachtoub and Hamilton 2017), which represents an unknown product from a known set, for
which an agent’s ranking could be defined to equal that of her least-preferred product in the set.
• Our positive results hold for Markov Chain choice models. d-level nested logit is a choice
model lying outside this class, for which the assortment optimization (i.e. single-buyer assortment
auction) problem is tractable (Li et al. 2015), but it is not known whether the optimal auction for
multiple buyers is tractable or structurally Myersonian.
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Appendix A: Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. Take any deterministic truthful mechanism defined by allocation functions
j1, . . . , jm. Fix a buyer i∈M and true list ℓi ∈Ω. Let Ti be the “taxation” function defined by
Ti(ℓ−i) =
⋃
ℓ′
i
∈Ω
ji(ℓ
′
i, ℓ−i)
which takes the union of all products buyer i could potentially receive based on the “lies” ℓ′i she could
potentially tell. Through the incentive-compatibility constraints (1), we deduce that ℓi(ji(ℓi, ℓ−i)) ≤ ℓi(j)
for all j ∈ Ti(ℓ−i). Through the individual-rationality constraints (2), we deduce that ℓi(ji(ℓi, ℓ−i))≤ ℓi(0).
Since it is obvious that ji(ℓi, ℓ−i) ∈ Ti(ℓ−i), the above deductions collectively imply that ji(ℓi, ℓ−i) =
argminj∈Ti(ℓ−i)+ ℓi(j), completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the mechanism described in Proposition 2.
Truthfulness: Consider any buyer i in this mechanism, and consider a realization of the reports of the
other buyers ℓ−i. Let j
′ be the lowest-priced product whose virtual valuation φi(rj′ ) would allow buyer i to
win the auction. Note that j′ 6= 0 (because the 0 valuation always has a non-positive virtual valuation), and
we write j′ =∞ if given this ℓ−i it is impossible for buyer i to win the auction. Now, consider the mechanism
defined via the taxation principle by Ti(ℓ−i) = {j′} (or Ti(ℓ−i) = ∅ if j′ =∞). Repeating this procedure for
all buyers i, we have described the mechanism in taxation form, and hence it is truthful.
Feasibility, and Expected Payment: We claim that for every realization of ℓ, the winner and payment is the
same as what would have happened had the corresponding valuations been reported in the classical auctions
setting. Indeed, in the classical auctions setting, since the ironed virtual valuations are decreasing, buyer i
wins if and only if her valuation is at least rj′ , and in which case she pays rj′ . Meanwhile, in our setting,
buyer i will make a purchase if and only if her list realizes to (1, . . . , j) for some j ≥ j′, in which case she will
choose product j′ and pay price rj′ , since she has buy-down preferences. Therefore, the mechanism described
in Proposition 2 can have at most one winner, and its expected payment equals exactly the expected virtual
surplus, by the known results in the classical auctions setting.
Optimality: To see that this mechanism is optimal, we again use the taxation principle. Consider any
feasible, truthful mechanism for assortment auctions under buy-down preferences. Under buy-down prefer-
ences, any non-empty assortment chosen for Ti(ℓ−i) is equivalent to offering only the lowest-priced product
j′ in that assortment. This corresponds to setting a threshold price of rj′ for buyer i based on the reports of
the other buyers. By the taxation principle for classical auctions, this translates to a deterministic truthful
mechanism, which is feasible because there is at most one winner. Since in the classical auctions setting,
even if we allow for randomized, Bayesian-truthful mechanisms which can charge arbitrary payments, it is
not possible to exceed the expected virtual surplus, this completes the proof that it also cannot be exceeded
in the assortment auctions setting under buy-down preferences. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We first apply small perturbations to all the VVM’s V1, . . . , Vm so that for any real-
ization of ℓ, the optimization problem of maxM′∈F
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓi) has a unique solution. This is equivalent
to using a fixed deterministic tie-breaking rule when maximizing virtual surplus. Having done this, we now
specify the mechanism by defining Ti(ℓ−i), the assortment offered to buyer i when the other realizations are
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ℓ−i, for all i and ℓ−i. This will result in a truthful mechanism, but we must show that it is also feasible, i.e.
that the set of winners will lie in F .
For any buyer i and realization of ℓ−i, there exists a threshold τi(ℓ−i) such that i ∈
argmaxM′∈F
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓi) if an only if Vi(ℓi)≥ τi(ℓ−i). Using the condition of implementability, we let Ti(ℓ−i)
be the assortment such that Q(Ti(ℓ−i)) = {l ∈Ω : V (l)≥ τi(Ti(ℓ−i))}. We claim that for any realization of ℓ,
this results in a feasible allocation. Indeed, let M ′(ℓ) = argmaxM′∈F
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓi). Then
i∈M ′(ℓ)⇐⇒ Vi(ℓi)≥ τi(ℓ−i)
⇐⇒ ℓi ∈ {l ∈Ω : V (l)≥ τi(Ti(ℓ−i))}
⇐⇒ ℓi ∈Q(Ti(ℓ−i))
and hence the set of buyers which make a purchase from Ti(ℓ−i) is exactly M
′(ℓ), which is feasible.
We now compute the expected revenue of this mechanism, which can be written as
∑m
i=1Eℓ−i [Ri(Ti(ℓ−i))].
By the condition of implementability, this is at least
m∑
i=1
Eℓ−i

 ∑
l∈Q(Ti(ℓ−i))
Vi(l)Pi(l)

= m∑
i=1
Eℓ−i
[
Eℓi [V (ℓi)1(ℓi ∈Q(Ti(ℓ−i)))]
]
=Eℓ

 ∑
i∈M′(ℓ)
Vi(ℓi)


where the second equality follows from the tower property of conditional expectation. This is exactly the
expected virtual surplus, completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix any feasible, deterministic, truthful mechanism. By independence, we can sepa-
rate the total revenue as follows:
Eℓ
[
m∑
i=1
rji(ℓ)
]
=
m∑
i=1
Eℓ−i
[
Eℓi
[
rji(ℓi,ℓ−i)
∣∣∣ℓ−i]] .
Now, consider any buyer i and fixed ℓ−i. By the taxation principle in Proposition 1, there must exist an
assortment Ti(ℓ−i) such that for all possible realizations of ℓi, buyer i is allocated her most-preferred item
from Ti(ℓ−i)+. Therefore, conditioned on any ℓ−i, we know that Eℓi [rji(ℓi,ℓ−i)|ℓ−i] =Ri(Ti(ℓ−i)), which is at
most
∑
l∈Q(Ti(ℓ−i))
Vi(l)Pi(l), by the insurmountability of the virtual valuation mapping Vi for buyer i.
Therefore, we can upper-bound the expected revenue by
m∑
i=1
Eℓ−i

 ∑
l∈Q(Ti(ℓ−i))
Vi(l)Pi(l)

= m∑
i=1
Eℓ−i
[
Eℓi [V (ℓi)1(ℓi ∈Q(Ti(ℓ−i)))]
]
=Eℓ
[
m∑
i=1
Vi(ℓi)1(ji(ℓ) 6= 0)
]
≤Eℓ
[
max
M′∈F
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓi)
]
where the second equality follows from the tower property of conditional expectation, and the inequality
holds because for any ℓ, it must be the case that the set of buyers i for which ji(ℓ) 6= 0 lies in F . This
completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 3. For any q ∈ [0,Q], let w1 ≥ w2 ∈ R be thresholds such that
∑
l∈Ω:V (l)≥w1
P (l)≤ q ≤∑
l∈Ω:V (l)≥w2
P (l), for which the difference w1 −w2 is minimized. By the definition of implementability, we
can find assortments S1, S2 with Q(S1) =
∑
l∈Ω:V (l)≥w1
P (l) and Q(S2) =
∑
l∈Ω:V (l)≥w2
P (l) such that16
R(S1)≥
∑
l∈Ω:V (l)≥w1
V (l)P (l) =
∫ Q(S1)
0
GV (t)dt
R(S2)≥
∑
l∈Ω:V (l)≥w2
V (l)P (l) =
∫ Q(S2)
0
GV (t)dt
where we have let GV denote the quantile function (1−FV )−1 of V . Let α ∈ [0,1] be such that q= αQ(S1)+
(1−α)Q(S2). By the minimality of w1−w2, we know that GV (t) can take on only one unique value (corre-
sponding to a single possible virtual valuation) over t ∈ (Q(S1),Q(S2)). Therefore, the function
∫ q
0
GV (t)dt
is linear in q between Q(S1) and Q(S2), and hence∫ αQ(S1)+(1−α)Q(S2)
0
GV (t)dt= α
∫ Q(S1)
0
GV (t)dt+(1−α)
∫ Q(S2)
0
GV (t)dt.
The LHS is equal to CQV (q), and the RHS is at most αR(S1)+(1−α)R(S2), which in turn is at most RF(q)
since setting αS1 = α,αS2 = 1−α is a feasible solution to the LP defining RF(q). This completes the proof
that CQV (q)≤ RF(q) for all q ∈ [0,Q].
For the second part of Lemma 3, let S(0), . . . , S(K) denote the nested assortments which form the revenue
frontier. For all indices k=1, . . . ,K, define the virtual valuation W (l) to be
R(S(k))−R(S(k−1))
Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1))
(14)
for all lists l ∈ Q(S(k)) \ Q(S(k−1)), which does not cause any conflicting definitions since assortments
S(0), . . . , S(K) are nested. Moreover, while it is possible that Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1)) = 0, in this case the lists
l ∈Q(S(k)) \Q(S(k−1)) have measure zero.
Now, the concave curve RF(q) is formed by joining the points (Q(S(0)),R(S(0))), . . . , (Q(S(K)),R(S(K))).
Again, it is possible that Q(S(k)) =Q(S(k−1)), in which case R(S(k)) =R(S(k−1)) as well, by the definition
of forming the revenue frontier. Therefore, we can remove any duplicate points where (Q(S(k)),R(S(k))) =
(Q(S(k−1)),R(S(k−1))) and then use the concavity of RF(q) to deduce that its slope, given by expression (14),
is non-increasing over k such that Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1)) 6= 0. To establish implementability, it suffices to check
the conditions for thresholds w which equal expression (14) for some k such that Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1)) 6= 0.
We claim that if w= R(S
(k))−R(S(k−1))
Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1))
, then setting S = S(k) satisfies the conditions. Indeed,
{l ∈Ω :W (l)≥w}=
k⋃
k′=1
Q(S(k
′)) \Q(S(k
′−1)) =Q(S(k))
and ∑
l∈Ω:W(l)≥w
W (l)P (l) =
k∑
k′=1
R(S(k
′))−R(S(k
′−1))
Q(S(k′))−Q(S(k′−1))
(Q(S(k
′))−Q(S(k
′−1))) =R(S(k)),
completing the proof. 
16 Note that we are not using the stronger property of Q(S1) = {l ∈Ω : V (l)≥w1},Q(S2) = {l ∈Ω : V (l)≥w2} from
the definition of implementability.
44
Proof of Lemma 4. Let GV denote the quantile function (1−FV )
−1 of an insurmountable VVM V . Note
that for any assortment S, ∫ Q(S)
0
GV (t)dt≥
∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)≥R(S), (15)
where the first inequality holds because GV (t) is a decreasing function, and the second inequality holds
by definition of V being insurmountable. Now take any q ∈ [0,1] and let {αS : S ⊆N} be a basic optimal
solution to the LP which defines RF(q). We can assume that the basic solution consists of an α ∈ [0,1] and
two assortments S1, S2 such that RF(q) = αR(S1) + (1− α)R(S2), q = αQ(S1) + (1− α)Q(S2), Q(S1) ≤ q,
and Q(S2)≥ q.
Since RF(q) = αR(S1)+ (1−α)R(S2), we can use (15) to see that
RF(q)≤ α
∫ Q(S1)
0
GV (t)dt+(1−α)
∫ Q(S2)
0
GV (t)dt
=
∫ Q(S1)
0
GV (t)dt+(1−α)
∫ Q(S2)−Q(S1)
0
GV (Q(S1)+ t)dt
≤
∫ Q(S1)
0
GV (t)dt+(1−α)
∫ Q(S2)−Q(S1)
0
GV (Q(S1)+ (1−α)t)dt
where the second inequality holds because GV (t) is decreasing. Finally, doing the variable substitution t
′ =
Q(S1) + (1− α)t, we can see that the second summand above is the integral of GV (t′) from t′ =Q(S1) to
t′ =Q(S1)+ (1−α)(Q(S2)−Q(S1)) = q, completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Let GV denote the quantile function (1−FV )−1. Fix any realization of ℓ−i and let
τ = max
M′∈F,i/∈M′
∑
i′∈M′
Vi′ (ℓi′)− max
M′∈F,i∈M′
∑
i′∈M′
Vi′(ℓi′),
the gain in virtual surplus accumulated from other buyers when buyer i is not in M ′ as opposed to in M ′
(which is a non-negative quantity because F is a downward-closed family). Let q be a quantile such that
GVi(t)≥ τ for t≤ q and GVi(t)≤ τ for t > q. Then the expected virtual surplus can be written as
max
M′∈F,i/∈M′
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓ−i)+Eℓi [max{Vi(ℓi)− τ,0}] = max
M′∈F,i/∈M′
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓ−i)+
∫ q
0
(GVi(t)− τ)dt
≤ max
M′∈F,i/∈M′
∑
i∈M′
Vi(ℓ−i)+
∫ q
0
(GWi(t)− τ)dt
where we have used the independence of ℓi from ℓ−i, and in the inequality, used the condition that CQ
Vi(q)≤
CQ
Wi(q). The final expression is a lower bound on the expected virtual surplus when VVM Wi is used in
place of VVM Vi for buyer i, since q is defined based on Vi. This completes the proof. 
Appendix B: Proofs from Section 4
Many of the deferred proofs from Section 4 will make use of the following basic proposition about transitions
on the Markov chain.
Proposition 9. Let A and B be disjoint subsets of N+ and let c∈N+ \ (A∪B). Then
P[c≺A] = P[c≺A∪B] +
∑
b∈B
P[b≺ c∪A∪B \ b]Pb[c≺A].
Furthermore, if d 6= c is another node in N+ \ (A∪B), then
Pd[c≺A] = Pd[c≺A∪B] +
∑
b∈B
Pd[b≺ c∪A∪B \ b]Pb[c≺A].
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Proof of Proposition 9 Consider the event c≺A that c precedes any node in A. For it to occur, the first
node visited among all the nodes in c ∪A ∪B must be either c, or some node b ∈ B. Conditioned on the
first such node visited being c, the event c≺A is guaranteed to occur. Meanwhile, conditioned on the first
such node visited being some b∈B, the probability that event c≺A occurs is equal to the probability of it
occurring had the Markov Chain been fixed to start at node b, by memorylessness. Therefore, using the law
of total expectation, we get
P[c≺A] = P[c≺A∪B] · 1+
∑
b∈B
P[b≺ c∪A∪B \ b] ·Pb[c≺A]
which is exactly the first statement. For the second statement, note that fixing the Markov Chain to start
at a node d outside of c∪A∪B is equivalent to changing the starting probabilities of the Markov Chain so
that λd =1. Therefore, the second statement follows from the first. 
Now we present the deferred proofs from Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider any iteration k, and product j 6= s(k) satisfying j ∈ N \ S(k−1) and
Pj[0≺ S(k−1)] 6=0 which was eligible to be added, but not added, to the assortment during iteration k. When
its externality-adjusted price r
(k)
j is updated during iteration k, we have
r
(k)
j = r
(k−1)
j − r
(k−1)
s(k)
Pj[s
(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]
≤ r(k−1)j −
r
(k−1)
j
Pj[0≺ S(k−1)]
Pj[s
(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1)]
=
r
(k−1)
j (Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)]−Pj[s(k) ≺ S
(k−1)
+ ]Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1)])
Pj[0≺ S(k−1)]
= r
(k−1)
j
Pj [0≺ S(k)]
Pj[0≺ S(k−1)]
(16)
where the inequality holds because
r
(k−1)
s(k)
P
s(k)
[0≺S(k−1)]
≥
r
(k−1)
j
Pj [0≺S
(k−1)]
, and the final equality holds by applying the
second statement of Proposition 9 with d= j, A= S(k−1), B = {s(k)}, and c= 0.
There are two cases. If Pj[0≺ S(k)] = 0, then the inequality ending with (16) implies that r
(k)
j ≤ 0. Further-
more, consider any future iteration k′ >k where the externality-adjusted price r
(k′)
j of product j is updated.
We would like to argue that r
(k′)
j = r
(k′−1)
j , by arguing that the probability Pj [s
(k′) ≺ S(k
′−1)
+ ] used in the
update step is zero. Since product s(k
′) was added to the assortment during iteration k′, it must be the case
that Ps(k′) [0≺ S
(k′−1)]> 0. However, we know that
Pj[0≺ S
(k)]≥ Pj[s
(k′) ≺ 0≺ S(k
′−1)]
= Pj[s
(k′) ≺ S(k
′−1)
+ ]Ps(k′) [0≺ S
(k′−1)]
where the inequality holds because we are only adding constraints (note that S(k
′−1) ⊇ S(k) since k′ > k).
Since the LHS equals 0 and the second term on the RHS is strictly positive, it follows that the first term
on the RHS must be zero (because a probability cannot be negative). This completes the argument that
0≥ r(k)j = r
(k+1)
j = · · · , in the first case where Pj[0≺ S
(k)] = 0.
In the other case where Pj[0≺ S(k)]> 0, the inequality ending with (16) implies that
r
(k)
j
Pj[0≺ S(k)]
≤
r
(k−1)
j
Pj [0≺ S(k−1)]
.
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That is, the incremental efficiency of a product j decreases over the iterations where it is eligible to be added
to the assortment.
Putting the two cases together, we arrive at the following understanding of the procedure. Since S(0) = ∅,
on iteration k=1, all products j ∈N satisfy Pj [0≺ S(k−1)] 6= 0 and are eligible to be added to the assortment.
Every iteration, a product s(k) gets added, and for all other products j that were eligible to be added during
iteration k (these products satisfy Pj[0 ≺ S(k−1)] 6= 0), either j is made ineligible by the addition of s(k)
(this is the second statement of Proposition 3 where Pj[0 ≺ S(k)] = 0), or the incremental efficiency of j
decreases. If j is eventually added into the assortment at a later iteration k′ > k (this is the first statement
of Proposition 3), then
r
(k′−1)
s(k
′)
Ps(k′) [0≺ S
(k′−1)]
≤
r
(k−1)
s(k
′)
Ps(k′) [0≺ S
(k−1)]
≤
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S(k−1)]
where the second inequality holds because product s(k) had the highest incremental efficiency during iteration
k. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Proceed by induction. If k=0, then S(0) = ∅ and r(0)j = rj for all j. Both the LHS
and the RHS of the statement describe R(S), the revenue under the original prices from offering assortment
S.
If k > 0, then suppose that the statement holds with k replaced by k− 1. We can write
R(S(k) ∪S)−R(S(k)) = (R(S(k−1) ∪ s(k) ∪S)−R(S(k−1)))− (R(S(k−1) ∪ s(k))−R(S(k−1))).
By the induction hypothesis, this equals
r
(k−1)
s(k)
P[s(k) ≺ (S(k−1) ∪S)+] +
∑
j∈S
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k) ∪S \ j)+]− r
(k−1)
s(k)
P[s(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]
=
∑
j∈S
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k) ∪S \ j)+]− r
(k−1)
s(k)
(P[s(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]−P[s
(k) ≺ (S(k−1) ∪S)+])
=
∑
j∈S
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k) ∪S \ j)+]− r
(k−1)
s(k)
∑
j∈S
P[j ≺ (S(k) ∪S \ j)+]Pj[s
(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]
=
∑
j∈S
r
(k)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k) ∪S \ j)+].
where the second equality applies the first statement of Proposition 9 with A= S
(k−1)
+ , B = S, and c= s
(k),
and the final equality follows from the way r
(k)
j is defined for all j ∈ S ⊆N \S
(k). This completes the induction
and the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Proceed by induction. When k = 0, the statement clearly holds. When k > 0,
suppose that R(S(k−1)) =
∑
l∈Q(S(k−1)) V (l)P (l). By Proposition 4,
R(S(k−1) ∪ s(k))−R(S(k−1)) = r(k−1)
s(k)
P[s(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]
=
(
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S(k−1)]
)(
P[s(k) ≺ S(k−1)+ ]Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1)]
)
.
The first term equals the virtual valuation V (l) of lists l ∈L(s(k) ≺ 0≺ S(k−1)). The second term equals the
measure of such lists, denoted by P[s(k) ≺ 0≺ S(k−1)].
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Therefore, R(S(k−1) ∪ s(k))−R(S(k−1)) =
∑
l∈L(s(k)≺0≺S(k−1)) V (l)P (l). Combining this with the induction
hypothesis, we get that
R(S(k)) =
∑
l∈Q(S(k−1))
V (l)P (l)+
∑
l∈L(s(k)≺0≺S(k−1))
V (l)P (l).
The lists in Q(S(k−1)), which have j ≺ 0 for some j ∈ S(k−1), are disjoint from the lists in L(s(k) ≺ 0≺ S(k−1)),
and their union equals Q(S(k)). This completes the induction and the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Our goal is to prove that the expression
∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)−R(S) (17)
is non-negative for all S ⊆ N . First we show that this is true if S contains all of the products in S(K) =
{s(1), . . . , s(K)}. If not, we show that by adding the smallest-indexed product s(k) currently not in S into S,
the value of (17) can only decrease. These two statements combined yield the result.
To see that (17) is non-negative if S ⊇ S(K), let S′ = S \S(K), so that S(K)∪S′ = S. Invoking Proposition 4
with k=K, we derive that
R(S)−R(S(K)) =R(S(K) ∪S′)−R(S(K)) =
∑
j∈S′
r
(K)
j P[j ≺ (S
(K) ∪S′ \ j)+].
Now, by Proposition 3, r
(K)
j ≤ 0 for all j /∈ S
(K), which includes all j ∈ S′. Therefore, R(S) is at most R(S(K)),
which equals
∑
l∈Q(S(K)) V (l)P (l) by Proposition 5. Now, by the stopping criterion, there cannot be any
non-empty lists l /∈ Q(S(K)) with P (l) > 0, and hence
∑
l∈Q(S(K)) V (l)P (l) =
∑
l∈Q(S) V (l)P (l), completing
the proof that (17) is non-negative if S ⊇ S(K).
Now suppose that s(k) /∈ S, where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is the smallest index of such a product, i.e.
{s(1), . . . , s(k−1)}= S(k−1) ⊆ S. Let S′ = S \S(k−1), so that S(k−1) ∪S′ = S. Invoking Proposition 4 for itera-
tion k− 1, the following can be derived:
R(S ∪ s(k))−R(S)
= (R(S(k−1) ∪S′ ∪ s(k))−R(S(k−1)))− (R(S(k−1) ∪S′)−R(S(k−1)))
=
∑
j∈S′∪s(k)
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k−1) ∪S′ ∪ s(k) \ j)+]−
∑
j∈S′
r
(k−1)
j P[j ≺ (S
(k−1) ∪S′ \ j)+]
= r
(k−1)
s(k)
P[s(k) ≺ S+]−
∑
j∈S′
r
(k−1)
j (P[j ≺ (S \ j)+]−P[j ≺ (S ∪ s
(k) \ j)+])
= r
(k−1)
s(k)
P[s(k) ≺ S+]−
∑
j∈S′
r
(k−1)
j P[s
(k) ≺ S+]Ps(k) [j ≺ (S \ j)+]
≥ P[s(k) ≺ S+]

r(k−1)
s(k)
−
∑
j∈S′:Pj [0≺S
(k−1)] 6=0
(
r
(k−1)
j
Pj [0≺ S(k−1)]
·Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)]
)
Ps(k) [j ≺ (S \ j)+]


≥ P[s(k) ≺ S+]

r(k−1)
s(k)
−
∑
j∈S′:Pj [0≺S
(k−1)] 6=0
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S(k−1)]
Ps(k) [j ≺ (S \ j)+]Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)]

 . (18)
The final equality applies the first statement of Proposition 9 with A= (S \ j)+, B = {s(k)}, and c= j. The
first inequality holds because for any j ∈ S′ with Pj[0≺ S(k−1)] = 0, j cannot be one of the products added
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into the assortment before iteration k (since S′ ∩ S(k−1) = ∅), and hence r
(k−1)
j ≤ 0 by Proposition 3. The
second inequality holds because product s(k) has the maximum incremental efficiency at iteration k.
Meanwhile, since {s(1), . . . , s(k−1)} ⊆ S, all of the lists in L(s(k) ≺ 0 ≺ S) had their virtual valuations
defined during iteration k, equaling r
(k−1)
s(k)
/Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1)]. Note that Q(S ∪ s(k)) \Q(S) is exactly the set
L(s(k) ≺ 0≺ S), which allows for the following to be derived:∑
l∈Q(S∪s(k))
V (l)P (l)−
∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)
=
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S(k−1)]
P[s(k) ≺ 0≺ S]
=
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S(k−1)]
P[s(k) ≺ S+]Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1) ∪S′]
=
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1)]
P[s(k) ≺ S+]
(
Ps(k) [0≺ S
(k−1)]−
∑
j∈S′
Ps(k) [j ≺ (S
(k−1) ∪S′ \ j)+]Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)]
)
= P[s(k) ≺ S+]

r(k−1)
s(k)
−
r
(k−1)
s(k)
Ps(k) [0≺ S(k−1)]
∑
j∈S′:Pj [0≺S(k−1)] 6=0
Ps(k) [j ≺ (S \ j)+]Pj[0≺ S
(k−1)]

 . (19)
The third equality applies the second statement of Proposition 9 with d= s(k), A= S(k−1), B = S′, and c=0.
Now, since expressions (18) and (19) are identical, we see that
 ∑
l∈Q(S∪s(k))
V (l)P (l)−R(S ∪ s(k))

−

 ∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)−R(S)

≤ 0,
i.e. the value of expression (17) after adding s(k) into assortment S is no greater than before. We can
iteratively apply this argument to conclude that∑
l∈Q(S)
V (l)P (l)−R(S)≥
∑
l∈Q(S∪S(K))
V (l)P (l)−R(S ∪S(K)),
and we have already shown that the RHS is non-negative, completing the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Under an MNL choice model, since the no-purchase option 0 has a positive weight,
it is never the case that Pj[0 ≺ S(k−1)] = 0. Therefore, the procedure from Definition 10 always takes n
iterations. Moreover, note that at any iteration k, the term Pj[s
(k) ≺ S
(k−1)
+ ] in the externality adjustment
step does not depend on the starting node j. Therefore, for any of the remaining products j ∈N \S(k), the
difference r
(k−1)
j − r
(k)
j is the same, and hence the price ordering r
(k)
1 ≤ r
(k)
2 ≤ · · · is preserved throughout the
externality adjustment steps (recall that the initial price order is r1 ≤ · · · ≤ rn). This shows that indeed, the
procedure adds the products in the order n, . . . ,1 of decreasing prices.
Now, by definition, the virtual valuation of a list with highest-priced product j equals the incremental
efficiency (10) when j is added, in this case to assortment {j+1, . . . , n}. This incremental efficiency can be
calculated as follows:
R({j, . . . , n})−R({j+1, . . . , n})
Q({j, . . . , n})−Q({j+1, . . . , n})
=
rjuj+···+rnun
1+uj+···+un
−
rj+1uj+1+···+rnun
1+uj+1+···+un
uj+···+un
1+uj+···+un
−
uj+1+···+un
1+uj+1+···+un
=
rjuj(1+ uj+1+ · · ·+ un)− (rj+1uj+1+ · · ·+ rnun)uj
uj(1+ uj+1+ · · ·+ un)− (uj+1+ · · ·+ un)uj
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=
(rj(1+ uj+1+ · · ·+ un)− rj+1uj+1− · · ·− rnun)uj
uj
= rj −
n∑
j′=j+1
(rj′ − rj)uj′
which is the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 7. We know from Corollary 2 that assortments S(0), . . . , S(K), where S(k) =
{s(1), . . . , s(k)} for all k = 0, . . . ,K, form the revenue frontier. Note that if a product s(k) has a higher price
than any of the products s(1), . . . , s(k−1) before it, then Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1)) = 0, since buyers always prefer
the lowest-priced available product; this causes R(S(k))−R(S(k−1)) to be 0 as well. Conversely, if s(k) is the
lowest index among s(1), . . . , s(k) which means that it has the lowest price, then Q(S(k))−Q(S(k−1))> 0, by
the assumption that P
(
(1, . . . , s(k))
)
> 0.
Let K be the subset of indices k in 1, . . . ,K for which s(k) =min{s(1), . . . , s(k)}. Recall that (see Defini-
tion 11) the virtual valuation of a list ℓ is determined by κ(ℓ) =min{k= 1, . . . ,K : s(k) ∈ ℓ}. Under buy-down
preferences, where ℓ always takes the form (1, . . . , j) for some product j ∈ N , we can equivalently write
κ(ℓ) =min{k ∈K : s(k) ∈ ℓ}, with the virtual valuation then being V (ℓ) = R(S
(κ(ℓ)))−R(S(κ(ℓ)−1))
Q(S(κ(ℓ)))−Q(S(κ(ℓ)−1))
.
Now, fix a list ℓ. By the first paragraph, if κ(ℓ)− 1 /∈K, then we can inductively argue
Q(S(κ(ℓ)−1)) =Q(S(κ(ℓ)−2)) = · · ·=Q(S(k
′))
until reaching an index k′ such that either k′ ∈K or k′ =0 (and similarly, argue that R(S(κ(ℓ)−1)) =R(S(k
′))).
If k′ =0, then V (ℓ) = R(S
(κ(ℓ)))
Q(S(κ(ℓ)))
. Otherwise, if k′ ∈K, then note that s(k
′) >s(κ(ℓ)), by the construction of K.
Let s= s(κ(ℓ)) and s′ = s(k
′) denote the lowest-priced products in assortments S(κ(ℓ)) and S(k
′), respectively,
with s < s′. Using this notation, V (ℓ) can be written as
R(S(κ(ℓ)))−R(S(k
′))
Q(S(κ(ℓ)))−Q(S(k′))
=
R({s})−R({s′})
Q({s})−Q({s′})
=
rsP (
⋃
j:j≥s{(1, . . . , j)})− rs′P (
⋃
j:j≥s′{(1, . . . , j)})
P (
⋃
j:j≥s{(1, . . . , j)})−P (
⋃
j:j≥s′{(1, . . . , j)})
=
rsP (
⋃
j:s≤j<s′{(1, . . . , j)})− (rs′ − rs)P (
⋃
j:j≥s′{(1, . . . , j)})
P (
⋃
j:s≤j<s′{(1, . . . , j)})
= rs− (rs′ − rs) ·
1−P (
⋃
j:j<s′{(1, . . . , j)})
P (
⋃
j:s≤j<s′{(1, . . . , j)})
(20)
which agrees with the definition of ironed virtual valuation in Elkind (2007) after interpreting list (1, . . . , j)
as having valuation rj. This completes the proof.
We remark that Elkind (2007) has a notion of “discrete regularity” for discrete valuation distributions,
which causes K= {1, . . . ,K}, in which case s′ = s+1 and the denominator in (20) simplifies to P
(
(1, . . . , s)
)
.

Appendix C: Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 3. In this proof, we use the notation from Sections 3.2–3.3, with the buyer subscripts
i added back in. With such notation, Bellman’s equations for the dynamic programming problem at hand
can be written as
Ji(a) =max
S⊆N
(∑
j∈S
Pi(Q
j(S))
(
rj + Ji+1(a− 1)
)
+
(
1−
∑
j∈S
Pi(Q
j(S))
)
Ji+1(a)
)
∀i= 1, . . . ,m;a= 1, . . . , b
(21)
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with boundary conditions Jm+1(b) = Jm+1(b − 1) = · · · = Jm+1(0) = Jm(0) = · · · = J1(0) = 0. An optimal
assortment policy is derived if we can compute all of the value-to-go expressions in (21), along with an
optimal solution S for each one. Using Definition 2, each value-to-go expression can be re-written as
Ji(a) =max
S⊆N
(
Ri(S)−Qi(S)(Ji+1(a)− Ji+1(a− 1))
)
+ Ji+1(a). (22)
Now, for any assortment S ⊆ N , we know that Ri(S) ≤ RFi(Qi(S)), by the definition of the revenue
frontier RFi for buyer i (see Definition 6). Moreover, regardless of the value of Qi(S), we know that Qi(S) =
(1 − α)Qi(S
(k−1)
i ) + αQi(S
(k)
i ) and RF(Qi(S)) = (1 − α)Ri(S
(k−1)
i ) + αRi(S
(k)
i ) for some k = 1, . . . ,Ki, by
Corollary 2 and the definition of S
(0)
i , . . . , S
(Ki)
i being nested assortments which form the revenue frontier
for buyer i (see Definition 7). Putting these two facts together, we get that the large parentheses in (22) is
upper-bounded by
(1−α)Ri(S
(k−1)
i )+αRi(S
(k)
i )− ((1−α)Qi(S
(k−1)
i )+αQi(S
(k)
i ))(Ji+1(a)− Ji+1(a− 1))
≤max{Ri(S
(k−1)
i )−Qi(S
(k−1)
i )(Ji+1(a)− Ji+1(a− 1)),Ri(S
(k)
i )−Qi(S
(k)
i )(Ji+1(a)− Ji+1(a− 1))}
Therefore, the RHS of (22) can be equivalently written as
max
k=0,...,Ki
(
Ri(S
(k)
i )−Qi(S
(k)
i )(Ji+1(a)− Ji+1(a− 1))
)
+ Ji+1(a). (23)
As a result, the dynamic programming policy has to in each state Ji(a) only consider the small number
of assortments S
(0)
i , . . . , S
(Ki)
i , which are computed tractably by the procedure from Definition 10. This
completes the proof that the optimal policy can be tractably computed.
For the first structural property, consider the maximization problem in (23) and let β = Ji+1(a)−Ji+1(a−
1) denote the value of inventory. We must show that with a larger value of β, the optimal index k ∈ {0, . . . ,Ki}
can only be smaller. To see this, note that
Ri(S
(k)
i )− βQi(S
(k)
i ) =
k∑
k′=1
(Ri(S
(k′)
i )−Ri(S
(k′−1)
i ))− β
k∑
k′=1
(Qi(S
(k′)
i )−Qi(S
(k′−1)
i ))
=
k∑
k′=1
(
Ri(S
(k′)
i )−Ri(S
(k′−1)
i )
Qi(S
(k′)
i )−Qi(S
(k′−1)
i )
− β
)
(Qi(S
(k′)
i )−Qi(S
(k′−1)
i )),
and that by Proposition 3,
Ri(S
(1)
i )−Ri(S
(0)
i )
Qi(S
(1)
i )−Qi(S
(0)
i )
≥ · · · ≥
Ri(S
(Ki)
i )−Ri(S
(Ki−1)
i )
Qi(S
(Ki)
i )−Qi(S
(Ki−1)
i )
.
Therefore, the optimal index k is one where
Ri(S
(k′)
i
)−Ri(S
(k′−1)
i
)
Qi(S
(k′)
i
)−Qi(S
(k′−1)
i
)
≥ β for all k′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
Ri(S
(k′)
i
)−Ri(S
(k′−1)
i
)
Qi(S
(k′)
i
)−Qi(S
(k′−1)
i
)
≤ β for all k′ ∈ {k+1, . . . ,Ki}. Such an index is clearly non-increasing in β. Moreover, for
any index k= 0, . . . ,Ki, there exists a value of β at which k satisfies these optimality conditions, completing
the proof of the first structural property.
The second structural property is just a restatement of Corollary 3. 
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Proof of Lemma 6. Consider any randomized online assortment policy. For any instantiation of the pol-
icy’s random bits, along with any instantiation of the random order in which buyers arrive under Problem 3,
the policy can be described by a deterministic mapping ALG, which specifies the assortment ALGi ⊆N to
offer to each buyer i based on the history (assortments offered and choices made) up to that point. Such a
history is fully determined by the realization of the other buyers’ lists ℓ−i ∈Ωm−1, having fixed the policy’s
random bits, along with the buyers’ random order, all of which are mutually independent events. Note that
under any of the arrival models, each buyer is offered exactly one assortment.
Therefore, the randomized online assortment policy can be described by a distribution over deterministic
mappings ALG, each of which is described by a collection of functions ALG1, . . . ,ALGm : Ω
m−1→ 2N . By the
taxation principle in Proposition 1, each deterministic mapping ALG corresponds to a deterministic truthful
mechanism, which results in exactly the same allocation as the online policy. Since such an allocation made
by the online policy always satisfies the feasibility constraint F , we have indeed described the randomized
online assortment policy as a distribution over feasible deterministic truthful mechanisms.
To see that the expected virtual surplus is an upper bound, let Rev(ALG, ℓ) denote the revenue earned by
deterministic policy ALG when the buyer lists realize to ℓ. The expected revenue of the randomized online
assortment policy is, using the tower property of conditional expectation,
EALG
[
Eℓ[Rev(ALG, ℓ)]
]
≤max
ALG
Eℓ[Rev(ALG, ℓ)].
By Theorem 2, the RHS is upper-bounded by the expected virtual surplus when the list distributions are
given by Markov Chain choice models, completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 7. At any step in the online accept-reject policy, it considers a buyer i, who could
be either fixed, selected uniformly at random from the remaining buyers, or selected by the policy. The
policy’s decision on i can be captured by a single threshold wi, where buyer i is accepted if and only if
her virtual valuation Vi(ℓi) is at least wi. The threshold wi can depend on the policy’s random bits, but
is otherwise fully determined by the state up to that point, which involves the sets of buyers who have
been accepted vs. rejected. Since the list distribution Pi of buyer i is given by a Markov Chain choice
model, by the implementability of virtual valuation mapping Vi, one can tractably compute an assortment
Ti which when offered to buyer i has sales probability equal to Prℓi [Vi(ℓi)≥wi] and expected revenue at least∑
l:Vi(l)≥wi
Vi(l)Pi(l). By offering this assortment Ti in the online assortment policy, the state transition after
buyer i is distributionally identical to what it would be in the online accept-reject policy, while the expected
revenue earned on buyer i is at least as large.17 Therefore, by offering such an assortment Ti for every buyer
i, the online accept-reject policy has been translated into an online assortment policy whose total revenue
earned is in expectation at least as large as the sum of virtual valuations accepted. This completes the proof.

17 See Theorem 2 and the conditions of implementability from Definition 3. For this proof, we do not require the
stronger condition of Q(Ti) = {l : Vi(l)≥wi}, because we are only analyzing sequential mechanisms. By contrast, the
stronger condition is required for the proof of Lemma 3, where general simultaneous mechanisms are analyzed.
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Appendix D: Discussion of Optimal Assortment Auction as Benchmark
In this section we explain why the concept of assortment auctions allows the “barrier” of 1− 1/e on the
approximation ratio of online assortment problems to be broken.
We fix the feasible family to take the form F = {M ′ : |M ′| ≤ b} for some b > 0. We then define a problem
instance I to consist of the products’ prices r1, . . . , rn and the buyers’ list distributions P1, . . . , Pm.
Definition 14. For any instance I, its Choice-based Deterministic Linear Program (CDLP) is the fol-
lowing optimization problem with decision variables xi(S):
max
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Ri(S)xi(S)
s.t.
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Qi(S)xi(S)≤ b
∑
S⊆N
xi(S) = 1 i∈M
xi(S)≥ 0 i∈M,S ⊆N
Definition 15. For any instance I:
• Let OPTCDLP(I) denote the optimal objective value of the CDLP of instance I;
• Let OPTAA(I) denote the expected revenue of the optimal assortment auction on I;
• Let OPTOnline(I) denote the expected revenue of the optimal (random-order or free-order, depending on
the setting) online assortment policy on I;
• Let ALG(I) denote the expected revenue of a specific, polynomial-time (random-order or free-order)
online assortment policy on I.
The CDLP was introduced in Gallego et al. (2004), and is also known as the ex-ante relaxation (Yan 2011,
Niazadeh et al. 2018) or fluid approximation (Reiman and Wang 2008, Bumpensanti and Wang 2018) in
different literature. In all of these areas, the analogue of OPTCDLP(I) provides an upper bound on OPTOnline(I),
and in turn the revenue obtainable by any online policy. Since OPTCDLP(I) can be easily expressed as the
objective value of an optimal solution satisfying the constraints of an LP, a popular method to establish a
c-approximation (with c≤ 1) for a specific online policy is to show that
ALG(I)
OPTCDLP(I)
≥ c ∀I, (24)
which implies the desired approximation guarantee
ALG(I)
OPTOnline(I)
≥ c ∀I (25)
due to the folklore result that OPTOnline(I)≤OPTCDLP(I).
However, such a method which establishes (25) through (24) cannot achieve an approximation ratio better
than c= 1− b
b
b!eb
. This is because there exists an instance I for which
ALG(I)
OPTCDLP(I)
= 1−
bb
b!eb
. (26)
(More precisely, there exists a family of instances I for which the ratio between ALG(I) and OPTCDLP(I)
approaches 1− b
b
b!eb
; see Yan (2011) for the original construction or Ma et al. (2018b) for the construction
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in the context of assortment. It involves having a single product, b/ε IID buyers each of whom purchase
the product with probability ε, and taking ε→ 0.) Note that when b = 1, the expression in (26) equals
1− 1/e≈ 0.632. The separation in (26) between ALG(I) and OPTCDLP(I) is known in some literature as the
correlation gap (see Yan 2011).
Therefore, our strategy is to instead establish (25) by showing that
ALG(I)
OPTAA(I)
≥ c ∀I, (27)
which suffices because OPTOnline(I)≤OPTAA(I), as shown in Lemma 6 (any free-order assortment policy can
be executed as an assortment auction). Normally, it would be more difficult to prove (27) instead of (24),
but due to the characterization that OPTAA(I) equals our notion of expected virtual surplus under Markov
Chain choice models, (27) becomes possible to analyze.
Indeed, our Theorem 4 shows that (27) holds with c = 0.669, when b = 1 in the feasibility constraint F
and arrivals are random-order. Our Theorem 5 shows that (27) holds with c= 1− b
b
b!eb
+ δ for a fixed δ > 0,
when b > 0 is arbitrary and arrivals are free-order. These results make use of the prophet inequalities from
Correa et al. (2019) and Beyhaghi et al. (2018) respectively, and are not possible using the CDLP as the
upper bound.
Finally, we show that the optimal assortment auction indeed provides a tighter relaxation than the CDLP
for all instances I. That is, OPTAA(I) is sandwiched between OPTOnline(I) and OPTCDLP(I). Therefore,
the introduction of the assortment auction as an alternate upper bound for online assortment policies can
only lead to improved approximation guarantees. Of course, there is still generally a separation18 between
OPTAA(I) and OPTOnline(I), and even better guarantees could potentially arise from analyzing OPTOnline(I)
directly19.
Lemma 8. For any instance I, OPTAA(I)≤OPTCDLP(I).
Proof. We now prove the second inequality. Fix an assortment auction, and for all buyers i ∈M and
assortments S ⊆N , let Xi(S) be the indicator variable for the assortment offered to buyer i via the taxation
principle, Ti(ℓ−i), being S. This is a random variable with respect to ℓ−i, the reports of the other buyers.
Now, on every realization of ℓ, the revenue earned can be written as
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Xi(S)
∑
j∈S
rj1(ℓi ∈Q
j(S)),
which in expectation equals
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Eℓ−i [Xi(S)]Eℓi
[∑
j∈S
rj1(ℓi ∈Q
j(S))
]
=
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Eℓ−i [Xi(S)]Ri(S)
18 When b= 1 and arrivals are random-order, there exists an instance where the gap is
√
3−1≈ 0.732; see Correa et al.
(2019).
19 This has been done in the recent work of Rusmevichientong et al. (2017), but it is unclear to us how to use their
techniques to derive approximation guarantees strictly exceeding 1− 1/e.
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due to the independence of Xi(S) (a random variable with respect to ℓ−i) from 1(ℓi ∈ Q
j(S)) (a random
variable with respect to ℓi, which is independent from ℓ−i). Meanwhile, on every realization of ℓ, the following
inequality is satisfied:
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Xi(S)1(ℓi ∈Q(S))≤ b.
Thus, it is also satisfied in expectation, i.e.
∑
i∈M
∑
S⊆N
Eℓ−i [Xi(S)]Qi(S)≤ b,
where we have again used independence.
Now, set xi(S) = Eℓ−i [Xi(S)] for all buyers i and assortments S. This creates a feasible solution to the
CDLP (the final two sets of constraints in the CDLP are trivial to check), whose objective value equals the
expected revenue of the assortment auction. Therefore, the optimal objective value of the CDLP can only
be greater, completing the proof. 
